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This paper presents a theory that supports commonsense, qualitative reasoning about the
ﬂow of liquid around slowly moving solid objects; speciﬁcally, inferring that liquid can be
poured from one container to another, given only qualitative information about the shapes
and motions of the containers. It shows how the theory and the problem speciﬁcation
can be expressed in a ﬁrst-order language; and demonstrates that this inference and
other similar inferences can be justiﬁed as deductive conclusions from the theory and the
problem speciﬁcation.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Carrying liquids in containers and pouring or ladling liquids from one container to another are among the most common
ways in which people interact with liquids in daily life. People are very familiar with these phenomena and can reason
about them easily. In particular, people understand how the physical behavior of the liquids is largely determined by the
geometrical characteristics of the liquid, the containers, and the motions involved; they can reason about physical behavior
using only partial knowledge of the geometry, without full geometric speciﬁcations; and they can use the same knowledge
in multiple inferential directions.
For instance, people know that, if a cup has a small hole through the bottom, then liquid in the cup will leak out
through the hole, but that a dent in the bottom will not cause the liquid to leak. They can use this knowledge in many
ways: prediction—given that there is a hole, predict that the liquid will leak; explanation—given that the liquid is leaking
from the bottom, deduce that there is a hole; design—if you want the liquid to drain (e.g. you are designing a colander), put
a hole in the bottom; and so on. These various forms of reasoning can be carried out without knowing or positing a precise
shape description for the cup or the hole.
It is very desirable that an automated reasoner likewise be able to deal with partial geometric information. Precise
geometric information may be unavailable for a number of different reasons. It may not be possible for the agent to perceive
or measure the features accurately. The features may be inferred rather than perceived. The object may be in a preliminary
state of design, and the precise geometry may not yet have been speciﬁed. The features may be a result of a future event
which is not yet fully known; for instance, a reasoner may be concerned that an object may spring a leak and worry about
the effect on the liquid inside, without knowing where exactly the leak will be or what its shape will be. A reasoner may
need to reason generically about classes of similar objects and similar actions rather than about a single manipulation of a
single object.
The theory of ﬂuid dynamics, of course, contains a very large body of mathematics, mathematical physics, and scientiﬁc
software devoted to the question of predicting the ﬂow of ﬂuids; and these computations can now be done with very great
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accuracy and speed. However, these techniques all work, either by using a ﬁne-grained division of space and time, and by
calculating the force and ﬂow of each small piece of liquid at small step of time; or, if the PDE’s are solved or analyzed
exactly, by calculating the force and ﬂow at literally every point and instant. The techniques deliver extremely precise
predictions of ﬂuid ﬂow, but they require correspondingly precise speciﬁcation of the boundary conditions (the shapes of
the solid objects in contact the liquid).
As the evolution of forces and ﬂows may be extremely variable over a range of circumstances where the overall qual-
itative behavior is quite stable, there is an inherent mismatch between these techniques and the objectives of qualitative
reasoning. In AI applications, precise boundary conditions are generally not known and detailed predictions are not neces-
sary. Different ways of pouring from a pitcher to a pail, or different shapes of the pitcher and the pail, may give rise to ﬂow
and force patterns that are completely different; but the commonsensically important inference, that the liquid pours from
the pitcher to the pail, remains stable.
For this reason, we are looking for a characterization of the behavior of liquids that does not require calculating of
velocity, acceleration, momentum and forces. Not that these concepts lie outside a commonsense understanding of physics—
on the contrary these, or something similar, are part of a commonsense understanding—but it must often be possible for a
qualitative reasoner to reason about the large scale behavior of liquids without invoking these concepts.
The objective of this paper is to characterize some cases of commonsense reasoning about liquids at the knowledge
level [28]; that is, to demonstrate that, for some types of simple qualitative reasoning about liquids, one can develop a
representation language and a theory such that the knowledge used in the reasoning and the speciﬁcations of particular
problems can be (approximately) expressed in the language and the reasoning itself can be carried out as inference from the
general theory and speciﬁcations. This paper is thus part of the general programme proposed by Hayes and by McCarthy [18,
24,25] of developing automated commonsense reasoners by representing commonsense knowledge in logic-based languages.
(We will discuss the goals of the representation in more detail in Section 1.1.)
In this paper we develop a large part, though not all, of a commonsense theory of liquid ﬂowing around slowly moving
solid objects. We illustrate the adequacy of the theory by showing that it suﬃces for correct prediction in a number of
scenarios, including carrying a liquid in a closed container or in an open container, pouring a liquid from one container to
another, or ladling liquid out of a container using a spoon.
The primary example we will use here is pouring from one container to another. Speciﬁcally, we consider the following
scenario (Fig. 1): There is a pitcher, partly full of liquid, and an empty pail. Both of these “hold water”. The pail remains
in a ﬁxed position throughout the scenario. The pitcher is lifted, keeping it suﬃciently upright that the liquid inside does
not reach its spout. Once it is in position, with the spout (though not necessarily all of the pitcher) centered over the pail,
the pitcher is tilted until the capacity of the part of the inside of the pitcher lower than the spout is less than the volume
of the liquid. At this point, the liquid pours out of the pitcher, and falls downward into the pail, where it remains. At the
end of the scenario, the liquid is divided into a section that remains in the pitcher and a section that is in the pail. We
demonstrate that, given qualitative characterizations of the shapes of the pitcher and the pail and of the motion of the
pitcher, our theory allows us to infer the behavior of the liquid.
(Note: all of the ﬁgures in this paper are cross-sections in the x–z plane. Throughout this paper, solid objects are indi-
cated with diagonal lines, and liquid is indicated in grey. The fact that the pictures show liquid ﬂowing in polygonal patterns
reﬂects my personal limitations in using the drawing software; it is not at all a requirement of the theory.)
Many aspects of the commonsense understanding of liquids are omitted from our analysis here. Some of the most
important of these are:
• Liquids in modes that are not “bulk”, in Hayes’ [19] terminology, such as mists, wettings of surfaces, liquids absorbed in
sponges, and so on.
• Liquids in energetic modes, again in Hayes’ terminology, such as fountains or even splashes.
• Mixtures or solutions of any kind.
• Interactions of liquids with the atmosphere or other gasses.
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external constraints. Thus, our theory does not include waterwheels or other mechanisms controlled by hydraulics, solid
objects ﬂoating on liquids, swimming, and so on. (The theory may be capable in such cases of predicting the liquid ﬂow
given the motion of the solid objects, but it certainly cannot predict the motion of the solid objects.)
• Pressure and any consequences of pressure differences. In particular, we assume that all parts of the top surface of a
liquid meet the open atmosphere and are therefore at equal height.
• Viscosity, surface tension, cohesion, adhesion, absorption, and so on. We deal only with “dry water”, in von Neumann’s
sardonic phrase.
• Any consideration of heat, temperature, and phase transitions, such as evaporation and freezing.
• The feasibility of actions by an agent. The theory developed for physical feasibility of actions on solid objects in [11]
can be extended to this domain, but we will not discuss this in this paper.
• The theory yields incorrect predictions for liquids ﬂowing down a channel (Section 6). This is probably the most impor-
tant gap in the theory.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 discusses the various goals of this representational work in more detail.
Section 2 reviews previous relevant work. Section 3 gives a pre-formal account of the physical theory that we develop
here. Section 4 shows how the theory can be formalized; it presents the ontology, the formal language, and the axioms.
Section 5 describes a problem speciﬁcation for a scenario of carrying a liquid in a pitcher and pouring it into a pail;
sketches the structure of the formal inference; and demonstrates that the axioms and speciﬁcations are consistent by
exhibiting a speciﬁc model satisfying them. (A complete formal proof of the inference is given in the online appendix
http://www.cs.nyu.edu/faculty/davise/papers/liqAppa.pdf.) Section 6 discusses the problem of ﬂow in a channel, which is a
major gap in this theory. Section 7 presents the conclusion and discusses possible next steps for research.
1.1. Objectives
This paper undertakes a representational project with the following parts:
• We deﬁne a microworld of solid objects and liquids, which includes many of the basic large-scale behaviors of liquids
carried in solid containers, poured out of and into solid containers, and ﬂowing over solids. We state a number of
physical laws that govern the behavior of liquid in the microworld.
• We develop a formal ontology and a ﬁrst-order representation language in which we can formally state these laws.
• Extending this representation language with some additional geometric predicates, we construct a speciﬁcation of a
scenario of a pitcher pouring liquid into a pail with incomplete geometric speciﬁcations of the shapes and motions of
the pitcher and the pail. We demonstrate that, from the rules and the speciﬁcations, we can infer that some of the
liquid pours from the pitcher.
Of course, the physical theory is not intended to apply only to this particular speciﬁcation; it should apply to many dif-
ferent speciﬁcations and different directions of inference within this microworld, and we are quite conﬁdent that it does
(Section 5.3).
There are many ways in which such a representational project could be carried out, and numerous different desiderata
for the theory and for the problem speciﬁcation:
1. The theory and speciﬁcations should be logically suﬃcient. The conclusion must be provable from the speciﬁcations
and the physical theory.
2. The speciﬁcations should be qualitative. It would be (comparatively) easy to give geometrically precise descriptions of
shape and motion that would suﬃce to justify the conclusion. But that kind of inference can be done much better—
more precisely, robustly, and generally—by conventional simulation methods. The whole point of the theory we have
developed is that it supports reasoning from incomplete speciﬁcations. Other things being equal, the more general the
speciﬁcations the better.
3. The theory should be general. The theory should not apply only to the problem in question but to a wide range
of problems in the microworld. It should be usable not only for prediction but also for other directions of inference
(postdiction, planning, design, etc.).
4. The speciﬁcations for a prediction problem should be geometric. A well-formed prediction problem should consist of
speciﬁcations of the shape of the objects; the initial state of the liquid; constraints on the motion of the objects; and
isolation conditions excluding outside interference (no other object or liquid comes close to the scene of the action).
This is essentially the “No function in structure” rule of [15].
5. Speciﬁcations should be logically simple and use a ﬁxed geometric vocabulary. In a knowledge base that uses this
representation, the general theory corresponds to the ﬁxed knowledge base whereas the speciﬁcation corresponds to
the run-time query. Therefore, complex logical form or specialized predicates may be tolerable in the theory, since these
can be incorporated off-line into workable algorithms, but it is important that queries in the speciﬁcation language be
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achieving run-time eﬃciency.
6. The speciﬁcations should be ecologically valid. The constraints should correspond to the kinds of partial information
that are available in actual applications, or should be easily derivable from that information.
7. The theory and speciﬁcations should be computationally tractable. It should be possible for a program to draw the
desired inferences from the speciﬁcations in reasonable time. Until there is a corpus of examples and a proposal on the
table for an inference algorithm, there is no way to evaluate this. The theoretical worst-case results are all discouraging;
spatial languages much more restricted than this one are intractable or undecidable [2].
8. The theory should bear some relation to physical reality. The theory should be approximately correct, or correct in the
limit in some sense, or correct as an average in some sense, or in one way or another correspond to the physical reality.
A theory with physically very unrealistic assumptions is likely to go very badly wrong sooner or later.
9. The theory should be plausible as a cognitivemodel. To the extent that this can be judged reliably, it should be plausible
that the predicates correspond to concepts available to naive human reasoners. It should be noted that almost nothing
is known about what concepts are used for qualitative physical reasoning by human reasoners, so it would be a mistake
to let one’s own guesses on the subject dictate the form of one’s theory.
10. It is desirable that the predicates should be standard in computational geometry. It would be helpful, though it is
not critical, if the geometric predicates used were well-known and well-understood in the literatures of computational
geometry, graphics, CAD, physics, scientiﬁc computing etc. so that we could draw on methods from those disciplines
and interface easily with them.
The theory and problem speciﬁcations developed in this paper presented below certainly satisfy conditions 1–4 and, in
their current form, certainly do not satisfy condition 7. On the whole we have very much favored achieving the generality
advocated in condition 3 over conditions 6–10. In most respects, the theory is approximately physically correct (condition 8);
in some aspects, which we will point out, the approximation is quite crude. Condition 5 is hard to evaluate until many
different types of problems have been formalized, which we have not yet done. Some of the predicates in our representation
are standard (condition 10); many as far as I know as new here and of very limited applicability.
As regards cognitive plausibility (condition 9): At ﬁrst blush it would seem absurd to claim any degree of cognitive
plausibility for a theory with concepts like “continuity relative to the Hausdorff distance” (Section 3.7) or “bubble-free at-
tachment” (Section 5). But the truth is that the commonsensical human reasoner has some conceptualization of the fact
that liquids move continuously and of the geometric relation between a container and an opening. The formal deﬁnitions
here are intended as mathematical deﬁnitions that idealize or approximate the intuitive conception, and though the formal
deﬁnition is not very readable, I would argue that the actual concept is reasonably close. That is, this jargon is just a trans-
lation of the intuitive conceptualization of “continuous liquid motion” into “math-talk”, and, it seems to me, a reasonably
close translation. The major physical rules that are developed in this paper (Section 3.1) are, I would argue, quite reasonable
candidates for a cognitive model, though the details are designed in part to avoid the need for plausible reasoning, which a
true cognitive model would, of course, deal with. At minimum, it seems to me that the concepts and rules here constitute a
worthwhile ﬁrst stab at a cognitive theory of the domain. I do not claim that the cognitive processes involved at all resemble
the formal proofs in the appendix.
The important sticking point here is condition 6. As argued at length in [8], though it is clear that many AI applications
require reasoning from partial information, it is not at all easy to know, for a given application, exactly what kinds of partial
information are involved; and it is often very hard, for a given domain of interest, to ﬁnd an application that naturally
generates a collection of inferences from partial information to satisfy the requirements of condition 4. It is obvious that
people can reason about pouring liquid from a pitcher without knowing the precise shape of the pitcher; it is much harder
to say what it is they do know about the pitcher. Moreover, in realistic applications, some of the information that is available
may not satisfy either condition 1 or condition 3 above. For instance, one may know “I have often poured liquid from this
pitcher without trouble” or “The text refers to this object as a ‘pitcher’; hence, it is presumably possible to pour from it”.
But clearly neither of these facts support very strong deductive conclusions, nor are they geometric.
2. Related work
It is unusual, particularly in a fast-moving ﬁeld like AI, for a survey of previous related work to be dominated by a
single paper—Pat Hayes’ “Ontology for Liquids” [19], a companion paper to Hayes’ “Naive Physics Manifesto” [18]—which
was written almost thirty years ago,2 immediately became very famous, and has barely been touched from then to now.
Besides proposing liquids as a challenging and fruitful domain for research in automated commonsense physical reason-
ing, and proposing as an initial step the axiomatization of the domain in a ﬁrst-order language, “Ontology for Liquids” made
a number of critical contributions. The most important of these (certainly in terms of its inﬂuence on this paper) was to
show that a critical category in reasoning about liquids is that of a region of space that evolves over time, and that such an
2 “Ontology for Liquids” was written as a working paper in 1979 and circulated in photocopies for six years before it was published in 1985.
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paper it is called a “region-valued ﬂuent”.) Other important contributions of Hayes’ paper include:
• The categorization of different modes of liquids, in a commonsense understanding, along four, largely independent,
dimensions: bulk vs. divided, still vs. moving and lazy vs. energetic, unsupported vs. supported, in an extended space
vs. close to a surface. (Of the 24 logical combinations, Hayes claims that 15 are physically possible.)
• The development of a qualitative language of geometry guided by the demands of a physical theory. This is one of
the earliest works in AI on qualitative geometry, and, despite all the subsequent work in this area [2], still one of
comparatively few that is designed to ﬁt with a physical theory. (DeKleer’s NEWTON [14] predates it in both respects,
but is much more limited in both the geometry and the physics.)
Moreover, the discussion in “Ontology for Liquids” is in many respects broader than this paper. Hayes touches on such
subjects as the ﬁfteen modes of liquids mentioned above, liquids adhering to surfaces, solid objects ﬂoating on liquids, and
others, which we do not consider here.
However, the logic presented in “Ontology for Liquids” has substantial gaps and ﬂaws. The most serious of these is that,
in developing his representation, Hayes assumes that “Almost all the histories we consider in this paper . . . consist[] of a
certain piece of space in which something happens for a certain length of time; they are rectangular” ([19], p. 90). Both the
representation and the axiomatization depend strongly on this assumption. But the two examples he considers (a bathtub
overﬂowing, a liquid ﬂowing from a tilted container onto a surface) do not at all correspond to this assumption; almost
none of the signiﬁcant histories involved are rectangular. For that reason, it is actually impossible to ﬁll in the details of
the logical analysis of these examples given in Section 9 of “Ontology for Liquids”. This gap is very much obscured for the
reader (and, probably, for Hayes himself) by the fact that Hayes does not give a logical statement of the speciﬁcation of the
problems being addressed in Section 9.3
Rectangular histories are the norm only when the system is in the steady-state, and over the class of steady-state
histories, Hayes’ theory is indeed often adequate. But pouring is not a steady-state system, and rectangular histories do not
come close to dealing adequately with it.
Another problem, which as we shall see arises also with theories of very different kinds, has to do with the physics
of overﬂowing. As we shall discuss in more detail in Section 3, when an open container overﬂows at the top, the liquid
necessarily rises somewhat above the top of the container and spills out some horizontal distance beyond the edge of the
container. Neither of these is consistent with Hayes’ theory. In particular, as soon as a liquid goes beyond the edge of the
container, then it must fall straight down; therefore, it cannot travel outward any ﬁnite distance.
2.1. Other AI theories of liquids
A number of other AI theories have dealt with geometrically and physically rich models of liquids. Gardin and Meltzer
[17] simulate liquids in terms of particles interacting in a two-dimensional space (one vertical and one horizontal). They also
simulate rigid objects, ﬂexible objects, and strings in the same way. Obviously, no such representation can deal adequately
with qualitative spatial reasoning. Less obviously, the rules of physical interaction they propose lead to a system whose
behavior is determined by the grain-size of the discretization of time and space. (In standard scientiﬁc computation, as the
grain-size becomes increasingly ﬁne, the predictions hopefully converge on the actual behavior.) Speciﬁcally, in the “pouring”
scenario, once a particle of water has gone past the lip of the pitcher, it is unsupported, and therefore must fall straight
down. The result is that the liquid pours out of the pitcher in a column one molecule thick. (This is quite clearly illustrated
in [17] p. 679, Fig. 19.10.)
DeCuyper et al. [13] point out, correctly, some of the limitations of Hayes’ analysis, particularly in terms of the spatial
language, and propose a hybrid architecture for reasoning about liquids combining three representations: a particle-based
representation which tracks the movement of particles of liquid; a ﬁxed grid partition of space which tracks the occupancy
of each voxel of space, and a qualitative representation similar to Hayes’. They do not give the details, and, frankly, it seems
unlikely that this was ever worked out in detail. It is not diﬃcult to imagine a system that can compute a simulation and
abstract a qualitative representation, though this is certainly a non-trivial challenge; but it is very diﬃcult to devise a system
in which there is signiﬁcant information ﬂow in the opposite direction, from the qualitative analysis to the simulation.
Kim [21] developed a system that carried out qualitative predictions of the motions of liquids in response to the motions
of pistons. She also included in her model a special case of solids being acted on by liquids, namely the opening and closing
of one-way valves. Both the geometric and physical language of this system were quite limited.
Many AI physical reasoning systems have used a geometry-free model of liquids, characterizing the state of liquid purely
in terms of the quantity of liquid contained in speciﬁed containers, and characterizing ﬂow just as a process that decreases
the quantity in the source and increases the quantity in the destination. For instance Forbus [16] uses this as an example
3 This gap was also critical to the debate over Hayes’ argument between McDermott in his “Critique of Pure Reason” [26] and Hayes in his response [20].
McDermott claimed that Hayes’ bathtub examples required non-monotonic reasoning; Hayes claimed that they required only modus tollens. The truth is
that, in the absence of a speciﬁc problem speciﬁcation, there is no way to know which closed world assumptions are to be considered part of the problem
speciﬁcation, and which are to be considered as deduced using non-monotonic principles.
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time (the system assume that all ﬂows are constant-rate). Collins and Forbus [3] combine this with a model of liquids in
terms of collections of molecules, which supports some more sophisticated inferences.
2.2. Logical theories of commonsense physical domains
The work described in this paper is part of an ongoing project to develop formal theories of commonsense physical
domains. This work is mostly presented in three previous papers.
In [4] I presented a formal theory of a very small part of solid object dynamics, capable of supporting the inference that
a marble dropped inside a funnel would come out the bottom. The most signiﬁcant technical innovation here is the concept
of a “pseudo-object”, a geometric entity that “moves around” with a rigid object, such as the hole of a doughnut or the
center of mass of an object (Section 4.5). This theory has been very much extended in [11], which supports the conclusion
that a collection of objects can be loaded into a box and then carried in the box. That paper, unlike this one, includes an
explicit theory of manipulation by an agent.
An axiomatization of a kinematic model of one solid object cutting another is given in [7]. Two theories are presented.
The “object” theory views the process of a blade cutting a target object as involving a continuous change in the shape
of the target until it splits, when it becomes two objects. The “chunk” theory views the same process in terms of the
chunks of solid material contained in the target. (Every separate region deﬁnes a separate chunk.) A chunk persists until
it is penetrated by the blade, at which point it ceases to exist. These chunks are closely analogous to the “liquid chunks”
studied in this paper.
All of these theories are mutually compatible, and I hope to present them in an integrated form in a monograph currently
under preparation [12].
I have also done other, more minor and less well integrated, work on the formalization of physical reasoning.
Chapter 7 of [5] gives preliminary axiomatizations for a number of physical domains, including liquids. An axiomatization
of qualitative process theory is given in [6]. The main issue here is to formulate the closed world assumptions correctly.
The methodological paper [8] advocates structuring domain theories around microworlds rather than clusters, as pro-
posed in Hayes’ “Naive Physics Manifesto” [18].
Other than the above, there has been little work on logical formalizations of physical domains since Hayes’ original
papers, despite their fame and popularity. Schmolze [32] presents an axiomatization for a domain that includes actions,
events, processes, liquids, solid containers, and faucets. A liquid is modelled as a collection of “granules”.
Sandewall [31] developed a logical description of a microworld of points objects moving along surfaces. The chief focus of
this work was integrating non-monotonic logic with a continuous model of time. Fluents were assumed non-monotonically
to be continuous at each point in time; thus a model with a minimal class of discontinuities was preferred.
Three parallel papers by Lifschitz, Morgenstern, and Shanahan [23,27,33] axiomatize various aspects of the process of
cracking an egg into a bowl.
Bennett et al. [1] present an axiomatization of solid object kinematics built up from geometrical primitives.
2.3. Fluid dynamics
The elephant in the room here, which I can neither ignore nor adequately deal with, is the immense, deep, and sophisti-
cated mathematical and computational theory of ﬂuid dynamics. It would require years of study to gain a suﬃcient mastery
of this ﬁeld to be conﬁdent that the problems I am studying cannot be solved by existing techniques; or that an expert in
the ﬁeld could not develop a theory of power comparable to the one here, but grounded in standard ﬂuid dynamics. Such
a theory would by deﬁnition be more physically correct than the one here; it would almost certainly be easier to integrate
with standard methods of physical calculation; it might well be more extensible, easily to validate for consistency, perhaps
even a more plausible cognitive model. All I can say is that I have not found any evidence that the kind of reasoning studied
in this paper has been addressed in the existing theory of ﬂuid dynamics, or indeed is of any interest to researchers in ﬂuid
dynamics. As far as I have been able to determine, none of the techniques that have been developed in ﬂuid dynamics can
be applied at all directly to the kinds of qualitative information that we are considering here.
3. The physical theory
The physical theory developed in this paper deals with the motion of liquid around slowly moving solid objects. We
begin with a high-level sketch of the theory (Section 3.1); we then work through a detailed formulation of our proposed
physical rules, (Sections 3.2–3.5). Section 3.6 discusses the ontology of liquids. Section 3.7 discusses the constraint that
liquids move continuously.
3.1. The physical theory: High-level view
Our ontology, like Hayes’, has two dual categories that we use to characterize the motion of liquids. The ﬁrst category
is region-valued ﬂuents (Hayes calls these “histories”): ﬂuents whose value at each time is a region, such as “the region
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contained inside pitcher P1”. Many aspects of liquid motion can be characterized in terms of the quantity of liquid contained
in signiﬁcant region-valued ﬂuents, but some aspects, such as steady-state ﬂow or cyclic ﬂow, cannot. The second category
is bodies or pieces or chunks of liquid (we will use these terms interchangeably). A piece of liquid is a particular collection
of matter; a set of molecules, if you like, though our theory is not based on molecules. Thus we can say, “Some of the piece
of liquid that was in the pitcher at the start of the scenario is in the pail at the end of the scenario”. By contrast, in the
language of region-based ﬂuents all that we can say is that at the end of the scenario there is less liquid in the pitcher
and more liquid in the pail than at the beginning. To say that the liquid that is in the pail at the end is the same as the
liquid that was in the pitcher at the start and is no longer in the pitcher requires an identity criterion on liquid over time,
and thus requires the category of pieces of liquid. Hayes prefers using histories to using pieces of liquids; we use the two
concepts about equally.
Essentially, our theory of liquids consists of the following rules:
Rule 1. Liquids cannot penetrate solid objects.
Rule 2. The volume of a particular body of liquid is constant (incompressibility).
Rule 3. The motion of liquid through space is continuous over time (we will deﬁne the sense of “continuity” required here
in Section 3.7).
Rule 4. A connected region R is said to be “cupped” at a given time if the outside of the boundary of R consists of solid
objects everywhere except at a top, horizontal surface (Fig. 2). If a region (more precisely, a region-valued ﬂuent) R is
cupped over a period of time and is never full of liquid, then no liquid ﬂows out of R .
Rule 5. If a body of liquid can ﬂow straight down without encountering a solid object or a cupped liquid, then it does ﬂow
straight down.
Rule 6. If a body of liquid is in contact with a solid or cupped liquid but can ﬂow downward around it, then it does ﬂow
downward around it.
Given these rules, one can (informally) justify the analysis of the pouring scenario as follows: By Rule 4, the liquid
remains in the pitcher as the pitcher is lifted into position. By Rule 2, once the volume inside the pitcher below the spout
falls below the volume of the liquid, the liquid can no longer be held in the pitcher; since the pitcher prevents it from
ﬂowing out the bottom or out the sides (Rule 1), it ﬂows out the top. At this point, the part of the liquid above the top of
the spout cannot ﬂow straight downward because of the cupped liquid underneath it, but it can ﬂow at an angle downward
over the spout following Rule 6. Once it has cleared the spout, it can ﬂow straight downward, so it does so by Rule 5. This
brings it inside the pail. Once it is inside the pail, it cannot escape by Rule 4.
The objective here is to formulate these rules in a way that they are mutually consistent, strong enough to predict the
result of the pouring scenario, and ﬂexible enough to be usable with qualitative spatial information.
The ﬁrst problem is that the overﬂow of the pitcher in the pouring scenario necessarily contradicts Rules 5 and 6. If
liquid pours out of a spout, then it must necessarily ﬂow up somewhat higher than the level of the spout and ﬂow out
horizontally somewhat beyond the spout (Fig. 3). Suppose that the liquid rises to height DH over the top of the spout and
ﬂows out to a distance DW beyond the spout. Then at the earlier time when it had only ﬂowed out to distance DW /2
beyond the spout it could have ﬂowed straight down, and should have, if Rule 5 applied. Likewise, at the time when the
liquid had risen to height DH/2 above the spout, it should have started to ﬂow downward over the spout if Rule 6 applied,
and not have continued to ﬂow upward.
In a continuous model, such as we will use here, this leads to a Zeno-like paradox. In a molecular theory, it leads to the
conclusion that the liquid rises one molecule about the level of the spout and then pours out in a column one molecule
thick. As mentioned above, this is exactly the conclusion that Gardin and Meltzer’s program does come to [17].
The same problem can arise in any situation where a ﬂow over an object turns into free ﬂow. If a liquid has been ﬂowing
down a slanted surface, and then comes to a precipice (Fig. 4) then it must ﬂow some distance beyond the edge before
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Fig. 4. Overﬂow past a precipice.
falling straight down, but, again, if it does ﬂow a ﬁnite distance beyond the edge, then it is violating Rule 5 by not starting
to ﬂow straight down sooner.
Finally, the problem arises, though in a less clear-cut form, when a downward ﬂow terminates in an object. If a vertical
column of liquid is ﬂowing downward and hits a surface, then any part of the liquid above the object can ﬂow downward
and by Rule 5 must do so; but it is not possible that the horizontal ﬂow of the liquid begins exactly at the surface.
The true explanation here, of course, involves the momentum of the liquid; but as we have discussed, we wish if possible
to avoid reasoning paths that require reasoning about momentum. Instead, what we will do here is to posit that these kinds
of scenarios generate exceptions to Rules 5 and 6.
This solution in turn raises two further diﬃculties. The ﬁrst is that, in a monotonic logic such as we use here, if one has
stated that a rule has exceptions, then ever after, in order to apply the rule, one must ascertain that the exception does not
hold. As we shall see, this places demands both on the domain axiomatization and on the problem speciﬁcation.
The second, more important, problem is that some limits must be given on how far, spatially, these exceptions extend:
How far can liquid rise above the wall of a cup before it is required to ﬂow down, and how far horizontally can it ﬂow
out beyond the rim of a cup before it is required to ﬂow straight down? These are necessary, ﬁrst because it is obviously
the case that liquid in this scenario cannot ﬂow indeﬁnitely far up or out, and more speciﬁcally because this conclusion is
necessary to carry out the desired inference. If we cannot bound how far the liquid ﬂows beyond the spout of the pitcher,
then we cannot predict that it will ﬂow into the pail; it may overshoot the pail.
In this paper, we kludge the problem for the sake of simplicity. We deﬁne a characteristic distance maxOutﬂow, and
we posit that liquid overﬂowing from a cup rises at most maxOutﬂow above the top of the cup and ﬂows out at most
maxOutﬂow beyond the rim.4 This is a very crude approximation, and commonsense understanding is actually substantially
richer, but for our purposes here it will suﬃce. The actual distance followed up and out by liquid overﬂowing from a cup
is a complex function of the shapes and motions involved. My guess is that what a human commonsense reasoner actually
knows, and what an automated commonsense reasoner should know consists of three parts:
4 There is no physical reason that these should be the same constant; but there is nothing at all to be gained from splitting it into two separate constants.
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1. A rather sketchy knowledge of the absolute quantities involved. One does know that in pouring liquid at a normal rate
from a dining room pitcher, the distance of the overﬂow and the outﬂow are somewhere between a substantial fraction
of an inch and a couple of inches, not millimeters and not feet. One knows that the outﬂow pouring liquid out of a
10 gallon pail is larger, perhaps several inches, but still not feet; and so on. This knowledge is presumably gotten by
interpolating from observed instances using instance-based learning of the conventional kind. Even so, the choice of the
features to use presumably rests on an domain understanding of the kind we are studying here.
2. A more precise knowledge of the signs of the inﬂuences involved, in the sense of the classic qualitative calculus of signs
[15,16]. In particular, the reasoner knows that the more rapidly a pitcher is tipped, the thicker the stream comes out of
the spout.
3. Most importantly, the ability to use the knowledge in (2) in control regimes for pouring liquid to a targeted region
without spilling. The reasoner, now an agent, knows that if the liquid is not yet pouring or pouring too slowly, he
should increase the angle, and if it is pouring too fast or too far out, he should decrease the angle.
Unfortunately, expressing the control strategy described in (3), which involves feedback from perception to manipulation,
requires theories of perception, manipulation, planning, and control which are substantially beyond the scope of this paper.
It would not be diﬃcult to extend the theory in this paper to represent knowledge of the kind in (1) and (2), but it would
not lead to any very interesting new inferences.
3.2. Rule 4: Cupped liquids
We now proceed to a detailed account of our theory. Rules 1, 2, and 3 are correct as formulated on page 1546. As we
have discussed above, Rules 4, 5, and 6 interact in rather intricate ways, and stating them correctly requires some care. In
formulating these rules, it will be helpful to go through a series of approximations; that is, we will ﬁrst state the rule in
a form that is nearly correct, explain the cases in which it works, explain the cases it doesn’t work, revise the rule, and if
necessary iterate.
We begin our formulation of Rule 4 with a few basic deﬁnitions,
Deﬁnition 3.2.1. A region is a topologically regular5 set of points in 3, not necessarily either connected or bounded.
A region-valued ﬂuent is a function from time to regions.
Deﬁnition 3.2.2. A region R is thickly connected if the interior of R is connected (Fig. 5).
Deﬁnition 3.2.3. A region R is cupped at time T if:
1. R is thickly connected;
2. No solid object overlaps R;
3. Any boundary point of R that is lower than the highest point in R is a boundary point of some solid object.
Thus the boundary of a cupped region R consists of (a) a horizontal top surface (possibly disconnected, but of constant
height) where R meets the open air; and (b) the rest of the boundary, where R is bounded by solid objects. Note that the
cupped region may be formed by a single solid object or by many.
We can now formulate a ﬁrst approximation to Rule 4:
Rule 4.A. Let Q be a region-valued ﬂuent. Suppose that over time interval I , Q is always cupped and is a continuous
function of time. (Again, we defer to Section 3.7 the question of what it means to say that a function of time to regions is
“continuous”.) If Q is never full of liquid in I , then there is no outﬂow from Q during I .
5 A set of points is regular if it is equal to the closure of its interior. The regularization of set S is the closure of the interior of S .
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Before explaining the problem with this formulation and correcting it, let me ﬁrst discuss a couple of critical aspects
of the proposed rule, and then show that this rule works correctly in some cases where one might suppose there was a
problem.
First, when we say that liquid L “ﬂows out of” ﬂuent Q during time interval I , what that means is at some time in I , L
is inside Q , and at some later time in I , L is outside Q . This can happen, either because the liquid L moves, or because Q
moves, or both.
Second, the chief feature of Rule 4.A is that it applies to all region-valued ﬂuents that are continuous and always cupped,
not just the largest-possible cup at each time. For instance, in Fig. 6, one might deﬁne the following ﬂuents:
• Q 1 is the largest cupped region formed by the cup.
• Q 2 is the cupped region whose top is always 8 inches below the top of Q 1.
• Q 3 is the cupped region whose top is always 8 inches above the bottom of the cup.
All of these satisfy the conditions of continuity and of always being cupped. There are inﬁnitely many such ﬂuents. The
condition that Q is not full of liquid is met by Q 1 throughout the scenario; it is met by Q 2 from times S1 to S2, and
ends sometime between S2 and S3; it is met by Q 3 from S1 to S2, becomes false in S2, and becomes true again some time
between S3 and S4. During the time that it is met, for a given ﬂuent, the rule states that no liquid ﬂows out of the ﬂuent,
which is clearly the case. The point is that, since the ﬂuent Q is always cupped, any ﬂow out of Q can only come out of
the top of Q ; and the liquid inside Q only reaches the top of Q if its volume becomes equal to the volume of Q .
Third, the boundaries of the cup can be formed either by a single object, as in the pitcher example, or by several objects;
in fact, the collection of objects that form the cup can vary over time, as long as the interior of the cup is a continuous
function of time. For example, if you drop pebbles into a vase, then the “cupped region” is the interior of the vase minus
the pebbles; the rule then states that as long as the volume of the liquid is less than the volume of the vase minus the
volume of the pebbles, the vase will not overﬂow. Or one might have a cup formed by a cylinder and a piston that can
move the bottom of the cupped region up and down (Fig. 7); this will be a useful example for us in our discussion, since it
is easier to see what happens to the volume of the cup in this case than in the case of a tilting pitcher. In all these cases,
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Fig. 8. Ladling from a pail.
we assume that the liquid inside the cup can always reshape itself to the interior of the cup as fast as the objects move
around; this is part of the assumption that objects move slowly.
One might suppose that a scenario like Fig. 8, in which liquid is lifted out of a pail in a ladle, would contradict rule 4.A.
After all, the interior of the pail is a cupped region and the liquid in the ladle comes out of the pail even though the interior
of the pail is not full of liquid. But in fact there is no problem here. The interior of the pail, minus the solid material of the
ladle, does indeed constitute a cupped region at time S1, and continues to do so right until time S2, when the rim of the
ladle reaches the top of the pail. At that moment, however, the interior of the pail as a whole ceases to be a cupped region,
because it ceases to be thickly connected. In S2 there are two separate cupped region: One region that is inside the pail and
outside the ladle and one region that is inside the ladle, and there is no cupped region that includes them both. Therefore,
the ﬂuent “inside of the pail minus the material of the ladle” does not satisfy the conditions of the lemma, since it is not
cupped in S2 and after.
One might also suppose that inﬂow into a cupped region could cause trouble for the rule; surely if there is liquid ﬂowing
into a region there can be liquid ﬂowing out of it? The answer is no; there can be outﬂow only if the region is full of liquid,
in which case the condition of the rule is not satisﬁed.
The cases where the rule does fail are more recondite. Consider the case shown in Fig. 9: the piston cup, full of liquid,
is inside an empty pail and the piston is pushed upward. Suppose that the motion of the piston causes the liquid to rise a
distance DH over the top of the cylinder. Now consider the region bounded by the pail whose top is DH/2 above the top
of the cylinder. This ﬂuent does violate Rule 4.A; it is always cupped, it is a continuous function of time, it is not full of
liquid, and yet liquid ﬂows out.
We therefore have to make an exception to Rule 4.A in the case of a cupped region that contains another cupped region
that is overﬂowing. Speciﬁcally, we say that a piece of liquid is “driven” if it is overﬂowing from a cup (the precise deﬁnition
is given in the next sentence). Driven liquids are exceptions to Rules 4, 5, and 6.
We now can formulate Rule 4 correctly:
Rule 4. Let Q be a region-valued ﬂuent. Suppose that over time interval I , Q is always cupped, is a continuous function of
time, and does not contain any driven liquids. If Q is never full of liquid in I , then there is no outﬂow from Q during I .
E. Davis / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 172 (2008) 1540–1578 1551Fig. 9. Exception to Rule 4.A.
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3.3. Driven liquids
To complete the formulation of Rule 4, we need next to deﬁne precisely what is meant by a “driven” liquid. This deﬁ-
nition, as we will see, constitutes our theory of overﬂowing; overﬂow occurs in the region above the top of a cup where a
driven liquid is allowed to violate rules 4, 5, and 6.
The deﬁnition that we will present is obviously rather arbitrary and does not correspond closely to any physical reality.
Given the nature of the theory here, this arbitrariness is, I think, both inevitable and unimportant. It is inevitable, because
we are trying to characterize what is a very complex, dynamic process in terms of a few simple geometric constraints;
necessarily, the ﬁt will not be very good. And it is unimportant because the question of exactly what is happening at the
layer where liquid is overﬂowing is probably not very well understood by a human commonsense reasoner, and does not
much affect the large-scale inference that the liquid pours from the pitcher into the pot. What is important is that the rule
should be stated in a way that (a) successfully resolves the contradiction between the unqualiﬁed version of Rules 4, 5,
and 6 and the scenario of an overﬂowing cup; and (b) justiﬁes the inference that overﬂow liquid pouring from a spout can
only go a fairly small distance before Rule 5 starts to apply and the liquid pours straight downward.
Since driven liquid is caused by an overﬂowing cupped region, we must ﬁrst characterize the circumstance of overﬂow-
ing. Unlike Rule 4, which applies to all cupped regions, it is not the case that overﬂowing occurs whenever any cupped
region becomes too small for the liquid it contains. For instance, in Fig. 10, the liquid reaches the top of RA and rises above
it, but there is no overﬂow, in the sense of an exception to Rules 4, 5, and 6; the liquid just continues to occupy the cupped
region of the correct volume at the current bottom of the cylinder. True overﬂow and driven liquid occurs when it is not
possible for the liquid to adjust instantaneously to a new bottom of a cup, either because it is not inside any cupped region
at all any more, or because the nearest containing cupped region is some ﬁnite distance beyond the overﬂowing cup, and
the liquid requires some ﬁnite time to ﬂow out to it.
We are thus led to the deﬁnition of a locally maximal cup:
Deﬁnition 3.3.1. Region R is a locally maximal cup at time T if:
1. R is a cupped region at T .
2. There exists a distance D > 0 such that, if R1 is a cupped region in S and R1 properly contains R , then some point in
R1 is at least distance D from R .
Thus, RA in Fig. 10 is not a locally maximal cup, since there are cupped regions that are supersets of RA and arbitrarily
close to RA. By contrast, the inside of the ladle in Fig. 8 and the inside of the cylinder in Fig. 9 are locally maximal cups,
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because the cupped regions that properly contain them all involve the inside of the pail and thus contain points that are
far from the inside of the ladle/cylinder.
Deﬁnition 3.3.2. Let Q be a region-valued ﬂuent that, throughout time interval [T S, T E], is continuous and is always a
locally-maximal cup. If Q is full at T S , and the volume of Q strictly monotonically decreases throughout [T S, T E], then Q
overﬂows throughout I .
Deﬁnition 3.3.3. Let Q be a region-valued ﬂuent that overﬂows throughout time interval [T S, T E]. Let T be a time between
T S and T E , and let Q (T ) be the value of Q at T . Suppose that a piece of liquid L ﬁlls region R at T . L is driven by the
overﬂow from Q at T (Fig. 11) if:
1. R ∪ Q (T ) is thickly connected.
2. R is entirely within distance maxOutﬂow of Q (T ).
3. For every point P in R there is a point P ′ in Q (T ) such that the line from P to P ′ is entirely in R and the height of P ′
is less than or equal to the height of P .
Note that in these deﬁnitions, the liquid overﬂowing from Q is driven only as long as the volume of Q is monotonically
decreasing; as soon as Q stops decreasing in volume, the overﬂow ceases to be driven and starts being governed by Rules 4
and 5.
3.4. Rule 6: Flowing down
Deﬁnition 3.4.1. A liquid L ﬂows down during a time interval if the heights of the top and of the bottom of L are monotoni-
cally strictly decreasing functions of time.
Rule 6. If a piece of liquid L can ﬂow down at time T , then it does ﬂow down.
The question is, what do we mean by saying that a liquid “can ﬂow down”? Rather than analyze this in terms of
a general theory of possible behaviors of liquids, which raises rather diﬃcult technical issues, we will give an explicit
geometric characterization.
Deﬁnition 3.4.2. At any time T , nonFlowingSpace is the union of all regions of space occupied by solid objects, cupped
liquids, driven liquids, and “weakly cupped” liquids.
A liquid is weakly cupped if it is cupped by some combination of solid objects, cupped liquid, and driven liquid. Since
driven liquid and cupped liquid are, to a degree, resistant to being pushed out of the way, weakly cupped liquid must
likewise be, since there is nowhere it can ﬂow freely.
Deﬁnition 3.4.3. Point P is a ﬂow stopping point associated with region R if P is a local minimum of the top surface of R .
(R is the region occupied by an obstacle. A liquid incident on P cannot ﬂow downward at P .)
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Deﬁnition 3.4.4. A piece of liquid L cannot ﬂow down if either L overlaps nonFlowingSpace or if a bottom point of L is
incident on a ﬂow stopping point of nonFlowingSpace. If it is not the case that L cannot ﬂow down, then L can ﬂow down.
If a piece of liquid L can ﬂow down, in the sense of Deﬁnition 3.4.3 then either there is nothing below it, or it can ﬂow
around whatever is below it, or whatever is below it is itself ﬂowing down and thus making room for L.
Suppose, for instance, that in a given coordinate system there is a ﬁxed solid table with a round horizontal top of radius 2
lying in the x–y plane at z = 0, and suppose that there is a cylinder of water of radius 1 and height 1 sitting above the center
of the table at time t = 0. By our deﬁnition any piece of this cylinder that is incident on the table cannot ﬂow down; any
piece that is not incident on the table can ﬂow down. And indeed, assuming that the cylinder ﬂows outward and downward,
every piece not incident on the table will ﬂow down (Fig. 12). Consider, for example, the following ﬂow pattern: a point of
liquid whose position at t = 0 is 〈r0, θ0, z0〉 in cylindrical coordinates at t = 0 ﬂows to position 〈r0/
√
1− t, θ0, z0(1− t)〉 for
t between 0 and 3/4 (at t = 3/4 the liquid reaches the edge of the table). It is easily veriﬁed that in this ﬂow pattern every
piece of liquid has a constant volume, and move continuously, and that every piece of liquid not incident on the table ﬂows
downward.
3.5. Rule 5: Flowing straight downward
There are two main questions about Rule 5. First, what is the dividing line between regions where Rule 5 applies and
regions where only Rule 6 applies? Second, what is meant by the statement that a liquid “ﬂows straight down”?
As regards the ﬁrst question: As with our deﬁnition of “driven liquid” in Section 3.3, our deﬁnition here is rather arbi-
trary, justiﬁed on the grounds that in this kind of theory precision is neither possible nor necessary.
Deﬁnition 3.5.1. At time T , R is a ﬂow disruption region if the following hold:
1. R is thickly connected.
2. R is ﬁlled with liquid.
3. For every point P in R , there is a point P ′ at the top of nonFlowingSpace such that
height(P )  height(P ′); P is within maxOutﬂow of P ′; and the line from P to P ′ does not go through any solid objects.
Deﬁnition 3.5.2. The region ﬂowDisruptedSpace is the union of all ﬂow disruption regions. The region ﬂowUndisruptedSpace
is the complement of ﬂowDisruptedSpace ∪ nonFlowingSpace.
As regards “ﬂowing straight down”: The obvious interpretation of “ﬂows straight down” would be a simple vertical
translation downward. However, it is obviously impossible to have a steady ﬂow of liquid in a column that (a) translates
straight downward; (b) preserves volume; (c) does not break into droplets; and (d) accelerates under gravity. Rather, if (b),
(c), and (d) hold, then the stream of ﬂowing liquid must get narrower, and indeed this is what happens. But if the stream is
growing narrower, then the parts of the liquid at the periphery are not translating straight down, they are moving toward
the center. It is not necessary, at our level of precision, to have a theory that mandates that falling liquid accelerates, but
it seems overly restrictive to have a theory that prohibits it. Therefore we deﬁne “falling straight down” as a characteristic,
not of all pieces of liquids, but of a stream as a whole (or, more precisely, of a horizontal slice of a stream).
Deﬁnition 3.5.3. A piece of liquid L falls straight down if it falls downward and the horizontal projection of L is a monotoni-
cally non-increasing function of time. (The complete statement of this deﬁnition requires an additional condition to ensure
continuity. See Section 4.9.)
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the same vertical span that ﬂows straight downward for some time interval starting in T .
3.6. The ontology of liquids
There are a number of different ontologies that can be used for modelling the dynamics of liquid ﬂow:
I. Discrete models
I.1 Molecular model. A quantity of liquid on the scale of easy manipulations (between about 1 gram and 100 kilograms)
consists of between about 1022 and 1027 molecules, interacting through van der Waals forces.
I.2 Small particle model. Liquid consists of a collection of particles that are very small on the human scale but very
large as compared to a molecule. They are too small, and therefore too numerous, to allow reasoning that depends
on enumerating them individually, but large enough that each one can be meaningfully assigned properties that are
in fact statistics over large numbers of molecules, such as temperature [3].6
I.3 Large particle model. The behavior of liquid can be calculated by simulating the interactions of a fairly small number
(dozens or at most hundreds) of large-scale particles [17].
I.4 Spatial cellular model. Space is divided into a grid of cells, and the state of the liquid is characterized in terms of
the occupancy of the cells.
II. Continuous models
II.1 Fixed point model. The behavior of the liquid is characterized in terms of the evolving state of the liquid at ﬁxed
points in space. (This is the Eulerian model in ﬂuid dynamics.)
II.2 Flowing point model. The behavior of the liquid is characterized by tracking “points” of liquid as they move through
space over time, and describing the position of each point and the state of the liquid at the point. (This is the
Lagrangian model in ﬂuid dynamics.) For instance, the speciﬁcation of ﬂuid ﬂow in Section 3.4 is a simple instance
of a ﬂowing point model.
II.3 Fixed region models. The behavior of the liquid is characterized in terms of the occupancy of ﬁxed regions.
II.4 Pieces of liquid. The behavior of the liquid is characterized in terms of the motion of pieces of liquid over time.
Hayes’ theory [19] uses primarily the ﬁxed regions model and to a lesser extent the “pieces of liquid” model. Kim’s
program [21] likewise uses primarily the ﬁxed regions model. DeCuyper et al. [13] propose a hybrid architecture combining
a large particle model, a spatial cellular model, and a ﬁxed region model, but as mentioned it seems unlikely that the details
of this were ever worked out. As our above discussion indicates, our theory here uses primarily the “pieces of liquids” model
and to a lesser extent the ﬁxed regions model.
Space here does not permit an extended comparison of these ontologies, but let me discuss brieﬂy the diﬃculties that
arise in using the other ontologies for the kinds of reasoning addressed here.
The true molecular model I.1 is of course the most correct of these; but it is by far the most diﬃcult to use. The
relationship between the small scale interactions of the molecules and the large scale dynamics of liquid is mediated by
statistical mechanics, and the reasoning needed to get from one to the other is generally more complex than the kinds of
reasoning used in this paper or in continuous ﬂuid dynamics.
The small particle discrete model of [3] was developed to enable rather speciﬁc lines of inference; for instance, to reason
about liquid that heats up while ﬂowing past a heat source. No general dynamic theory has been developed using this
ontology.
The large particle model and the cellular model are both inherently limited in their precision by the grain-size of the
discretization. Neither is applicable in any straightforward way to reasoning with qualitative spatial information.
It should be noted that the large particle model is no less an abstraction of the true molecular model than any of the
other models described here; and it is a mistake to suppose that the superﬁcial resemblance between the large particle
model and the molecular model implies that there is any actual advantage to using the large particle model in reasoning.
A collection of 1023 molecules actually behaves in almost every respect more like the partial differential equations of ﬂuid
dynamics than like a collection of 100 particles.
The two point-based models II.1 and II.2 are the basis of ﬂuid dynamics. They have the advantages, ﬁrst, that an exact
speciﬁcation of ﬂow and other dynamic change can easily be represented in terms of closed-form formulas, as we have done
in above in Section 3.4; and that a very precise dynamic theory can be stated in partial differential equations. However,
neither of these is suited to qualitative reasoning. The evolution of the ﬂow ﬁeld and the partial derivatives involved are
unstable under the kind of qualitative variation we wish to consider, even in circumstances where the overall behavior is
very stable.
Note, also, that even in stating the standard scientiﬁc theory, there are facts that are more easily stated in the region-
based ontology than in point-based ontologies. In particular, the incompressibility of liquid is trivial to state in the region-
6 Gibbs used a somewhat similar model in order to apply statistical mechanic arguments to thermodynamics without needing to resolve the ongoing
controversy over the kinetic model of heat.
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only be stated quite indirectly, using the divergence theorem.
Ideally, one would think that there ought to be a language for describing large-scale physical phenomena that is agnostic
and indifferent to the small-scale structure. After all, the naive human reasoner knows how liquids behave on the scales in
which he can perceive and manipulate it and he neither knows nor cares what is going on at scales much smaller than he
can perceive; a commonsense theory should do likewise, certainly if it is making claims to cognitive validity. Unfortunately,
despite many attempts, no one has succeeded in formulating such a theory. Space here does not permit an analysis of the
diﬃculties involved; I hope to address this in [12].
3.7. Continuous motion of liquids
An important constraint on liquids is that they move continuously in space. In a “piece of liquid” ontology, it is not
obvious how this constraint should be expressed, since there are a number of different possible topologies over the space
of regions, and hence a number of different notions of continuity [9].
One condition that is indisputable is that the volume of liquid in any bounded region must be a continuous function of
time; e.g. the volume of liquid in a pail cannot instantaneously change from 1 pint to 2 pints. This can be guaranteed as
follows:
Deﬁnition 3.7.1. Let R1 and R2 be two bounded, topologically regular regions. The symmetric difference of R1 and R2,
denoted R1R2 is deﬁned as the regularization of (R1−R2)∪(R2−R1). We deﬁne the function dV (R1, R2) = volume(R1
R2).
For example, let A be the square with vertices 〈1,1〉, 〈−1,1〉〈−1,−1〉, 〈1,−1〉 and let B be the circle centered at the
origin of radius 1.2 (Fig. 13). The symmetric difference between A and B consists of the four corners of the square that lie
outside the circle together with the four “sides” of the circle that lie outside the square. The area of this region is 0.92.
It is easily shown that dV is a metric over the space of regular, bounded regions.
Deﬁnition 3.7.2. Let Q be a region-valued ﬂuent and let I be a time interval. Q is volume-continuous during I if it is
continuous with respect to the metric dV ; that is, for any  > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that, for all T1, T2 in I , if |T1− T2| <
δ then dV (Q (T1), Q (T2)) <  .
It is certainly the case that the region occupied by any piece of liquid is volume-continuous over time. However, this
constraint is too weak; it would permit a liquid to gradually disappear from one container and simultaneously reappear in
a container some distance away. Such a behavior would be volume-continuous but is clearly not what we mean by liquid
moving continuously.
Fig. 13. Measures of distance between regions.
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container to the other; whereas of course each molecule moves continuously. We can’t say that exactly in a continuous,
molecule-free model; but one plausible equivalent is to require continuity in the Hausdorff metric, deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.7.3. Let R1 and R2 be bounded regular regions. The one-sided Hausdorff distance from R1 to R2, denoted
“dH1(R1, R2)” is the maximal distance from any point in R1 to the nearest point in R2.
dH1(R1, R2) = max
P1∈R1
(
min
P2∈R2d(P1, P2)
)
.
The Hausdorff distance, denoted dH (R1, R2) from R1 to R2 is the maximum of the one-sided Hausdorff distance from R1 to
R2 and the one-sided Hausdorff distance from R2 to R1.
dH (R1, R2) =max
(
dH1(R1, R2),dH1(R2, R1)
)
.
For example, in Fig. 13, the distance from the point a1 = 〈1,1〉 in A to the closest point b1 = 〈0.6√2,0.6√2〉 in B is√
2−1.2≈ 0.214. Moreover, this is the greatest distance from any point in A to the closest point in B. The distance from the
point b2= 〈1.2,0〉 in B to the nearest point a2= 〈1,0〉 in A is 0.2. Moreover, this is the greatest distance from any point in
B to the nearest point in A. Therefore, the Hausdorff distance between A and B, dH (A,B) =max(0.214,0.2) = 0.214.
Deﬁnition 3.7.4. Let Q be a region-valued ﬂuent and let I be a time interval. Q is Hausdorff-continuous during I if it
is continuous with respect to the metric dH ; that is, for any  > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that if |T1 − T2| < δ then
dH (Q (T1), Q (T2)) <  .
Clearly, if a liquid consists of the union of molecules each of which is moving continuously, then the region occupied by
a piece of liquid is a Hausdorff continuous function of time, since each point occupied by a molecule at one time is close
to a point occupied by the same molecule at a suﬃciently recent time.
Nonetheless, there is a plausible argument that in certain important cases the constraint that the region occupied by a
piece of liquid is Hausdorff continuous is overly restrictive. There are two main cases of this kind.
Case 1. Suppose that solid objects O1 and O2 have ﬂat surfaces that can meet, and suppose that those surfaces are im-
mersed in liquid and pushed together (Fig. 14). Then the liquid ﬁlls the gap between the two surface up until the moment
that the two objects meet, at which point the gap disappears. At the moment that the gap disappears, the region occupied
by the liquid has a discontinuity in the Hausdorff metric equal to the radius of the largest circle that can be inscribed in the
common surface (assuming that the two objects meet in a planar surface. If they meet in a non-planar surface, the analysis
is more complex).
Case 2. Let O1 be a closed box with a ﬂat inner bottom surface and let O2 be an object with a ﬂat bottom sitting inside O1
(Fig. 15). Suppose that the entire inner cavity of O1 other than O2 is ﬁlled with liquid. Now, if O2 is lifted off the surface
of O1 the gap created between O1 and O2 is ﬁlled with liquid; since the volume of the liquid is constant, the gap must be
ﬁlled instantaneously. Again, the region occupied by the liquid is discontinuous with respect to the Hausdorff metric.
What are we to do about these two cases? One natural answer might be as follows. In Case 1, the idealization of the
liquid as continuous breaks down once the gap between O1 and O2 becomes a single molecule wide, and the molecular
nature of the liquid becomes critical. In Case 2, the idealization of liquid as incompressible breaks down; clearly what
happens in fact is that the liquid is slightly compressed until it can ﬂow to ﬁll up the gap. Since the idealizations are
not sustainable in these cases, these cases naturally lie outside the scope of the theory I am trying to develop. (Another
explanation is that the idealization of the solid objects as perfectly rigid breaks down; if the surfaces can bend, then they
can meet or separate gradually.)
Fig. 14. Hausdorff discontinuous ﬂow: Case 1.
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It is possible that this is, in fact, the best answer to the question, that we should simply exclude these cases and posit
that liquids move continuously in the Hausdorff distance. (One aspect of knowledge representation that is in general very
poorly understood is what to do about cases where an idealization breaks down.) But I ﬁnd this solution problematic. In
particular, note that case I appears in exactly the same form if O1 and O2 are immersed in a gas (air). I could believe that
when you push two objects together in liquid, there is always a residual ﬁlm of liquid between them, but saying that any
two solid objects that appear to be in contact actually have a separating ﬁlm of air does not seem at all plausible. Moreover,
it will hugely complicate our theory of the dynamics of solid objects if no two solid objects are ever actually in contact, and
all forces between solid objects are actually mediated by a layer of ﬂuid. And a theory that excludes the case of one solid
object from being placed against another would seem to be unacceptably limited.
Instead, in order to maintain at least the option of being able to place one solid against another, I have weakened the
constraint that the region occupied by a piece of liquid is Hausdorff continuous to read that it is almost everywhere Hausdorff
continuous; that is, any piece of liquid contains a subset that is Hausdorff continuous. This allows discontinuities like Case 1
and Case 2 to take place, but only with protrusions that are initially “inﬁnitesimally thin” and connected to a previously
existing body of liquid.
Similarly, though it is critical in a theory of liquids is that a piece of liquid can break into disconnected parts and that
a piece of liquid can deform itself into a shape of arbitrarily large diameter, we want to prohibit ﬂows patterns in which
every piece of liquid breaks into parts, or in which every piece of liquid becomes very long and thin. Therefore, we impose
the similar condition that, over any ﬁnite time interval, every piece of liquid contains a subpiece that is thickly connected
and has a small diameter throughout the time interval.
Deﬁnition 3.7.5. A piece of liquid L has a simple ﬂow of maximal diameter D during time interval [T S, T E] if throughout
[T S, T E], L is Hausdorff continuous, is thickly connected, and has a diameter at most D .
Rule 3. For any piece of liquid L and time interval I ,
• The region occupied by L is volume continuous;
• For any distance D > 0 there is a subset L1 of L that has simple ﬂow of maximal diameter D during I .
It is easily shown that Rule 3 as stated above is ﬂexible enough to allows Cases 1 and 2 above but strong enough to
prohibit a liquid from disappearing from one place and reappearing at a separated place. To show the latter we use a proof
by contradiction. Suppose that liquid L gradually disappears from R1 and reappears in R2, where R1 and R2 are separated.
Then there must exist a subset L1 of L that has simple ﬂow. But L1 must likewise move from R1 to R2, which contradicts
both the condition that L1 is Hausdorff continuous and the condition that it is always thickly connected.
We also wish to impose a rule that discontinuities like Cases 1 and 2 can only happen under special circumstances. For
our purposes in this paper, it suﬃces to say that they cannot happen in ﬂowUndisruptedSpace. The exact statement is given
in axiom DOWN.4, and will be discussed in Section 4.9.
(One of the reviewers suggested an alternative solution to this problem, which would be to add an axiom stating, in
effect,
for each piece of liquid L and times T S, T E
there exists a ﬁnite set of time points T1 . . . Tk between T S and T E
such that for every subset L1 of L,
L1 is Hausdorff continuous throughout T S, T E except at T1 . . . Tk .
With a small extension to the temporal vocabulary, this can be recast in valid ﬁrst-order form. I don’t know whether this
alternative axiom is adequate or how it relates logically to Rule 3 above.)
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This section describes how the physical theory developed in Section 3 can be represented in formal logic. This is ac-
tually reasonably straightforward; we have covered most of the tricky issues already. In this section we ﬁrst describe the
foundational theories: notational conventions and system of sorts (Section 4.1), theories of real arithmetic and of Boolean
operations on ﬁnite sets of objects (4.2) and the language and theory of time (4.3), and space (4.4). We then proceed to
the parts of the paper speciﬁc to the theory of liquids. Section 4.5 describes the ontology of solids and liquids. Section 4.6
formalizes the kinematic theory, which includes Rules 1, 2, and 3. Section 4.7 formalizes our theory of overﬂowing, particu-
larly the deﬁnition of driven liquid (Deﬁnition 3.3.3 above). Section 4.8 formalizes the theory of cupped liquids, particularly
Rule 4. Section 4.9 formalizes the theory of downward ﬂow, particularly Rules 5 and 6.
It may be of methodological interest to note that, though the exposition in this paper follows a linear sequence of ﬁrst
working through the pre-formal theory, next formalizing the theory, then verifying the proof, the actual progression of
the research project did not proceed in anything like so systematic a fashion. Rather, at the time when I ﬁrst thought I
had completed the representational work and could now easily work out the formal proof of the example (in early April
2007), both the physical theory and the problem speciﬁcations were quite different from when I ﬁnally completed the proof
(in mid July); inadequate in many respects, overly detailed or overly constrained or even inconsistent in others. Many large
holes in the physical theory and the speciﬁcations were found through the impossibility of closing surprisingly minor details
of desired lemmas. I am not advocating this as a method of research—in fact, I suspect I could have saved time overall if I
had spent more time earlier on the pre-formal theory before entering on to the work of formalization—just saying that this
is, in fact, how this project developed.
We assume the standard mathematical theories of integer and real arithmetic, Boolean operators on ﬁnite sets, Euclidean
geometry, and continuous functions. Therefore, in our axiomatization, we will enumerate the sorts and symbols we need,
but we will not list the axioms. In our formal proof, we cite theorems from these theories as needed without axiomatic
proofs (though when the theorems are not obvious, we give proofs in the usual sense).
4.1. Notational conventions
All this is largely standard and self-explanatory, but it is as well to lay it out systematically.
Our axioms are stated in a sorted ﬁrst-order logic. We use symbols in Roman font beginning with a lower-case letter,
such as “openBox” for constant, function, and predicate symbols. We use upper case symbols in italics for variables. Standard
mathematical functions and predicates are used in the standard way; e.g. X1+ X2 is an inﬁx function; the curly brackets of
{E1, E2} is an outﬁx function (mapping E1 and E2 to the set {E1, E2}). To aid readability, the sort of a variable is generally
indicated by the ﬁrst letter; however, all axioms are stated so that this convention is not necessary. Quantiﬁed variables are
subscripted to their quantiﬁer. For brevity, we use two forms of restricted quantiﬁcation in the subscript: a variable may
be restricted by sort or by membership in a set. Logical operators follow the following precedence, from highest to lowest:
negation ¬, conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨, implication ⇒, equivalence ⇔, deﬁnitional equivalence ≡, and quantiﬁers ∀ and
∃. Thus, the scope of a quantiﬁer is to the end of the formula or to a right bracket that contains it. Free variables are taken
to be universally quantiﬁed, where the scope of the implicit quantiﬁer is the entire formula. Greek letters are infrequently
used as meta-variables.
We have a hierarchical system of sorts, which is interpreted as syntactic sugar for a standard ﬁrst-order theory with a
null element ⊥. (The null element is never used explicitly in our formulas, except in the axioms of sorts in Table 1.) In the
translation to the base theory, an individual sort such as “object” or “time” is considered an entity. There are two predicates
over sorts: “sortOf(X, S)”, meaning that X is an entity of sort S , and “subsort(S1, S2)”, meaning that S1 is a subsort of S2.
We will abuse notation in our formulas by writing “S(X)” where S is a sort instead of “sortOf(X, S)”; e.g. we will write
“object(O )” instead of “sortOf(X ,object)”. The sorts of the arguments to predicate and function symbols and to the values
of function and constant symbols will be declared in a self-explanatory notation when these symbols are deﬁned. Table 1
shows the translation of sort declarations into the base language.
As axiom SORT.2 indicates, all functions are required to be total over the sort on which they are deﬁned. Hence, when
we have a mapping which is single-valued but not total, we will use a relation symbol for it and add an axiom stating that
it is single valued (when necessary). The “value” of the mapping will conventionally be the last argument. For this reason,
in cases where we do use a function symbol, even if that is deﬁned and not primitive, we do not have to add an axiom
stating that the function is total; such an axiom is implicit from the use of the function symbol.
Axiom SORT.4 combined with axioms SORT.1 and SORT.2 implies that any ground term with argument ⊥ evaluates to ⊥
and that any ground atomic formula with argument ⊥ is false, unless the predicate is the equals sign.
4.2. Real arithmetic; Set theory
As stated above, we use real arithmetic and Boolean set theory over sets of elements. (As we shall see below, the sets
that we need in this paper are sets of objects and sets of geometric points; these two sorts are therefore deﬁnes as subsorts
of “element”.) Table 2 enumerates the sorts and the symbols used.
E. Davis / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 172 (2008) 1540–1578 1559Table 1
Axioms of sorts
SORT.1 The declaration of predicate symbol α as taking arguments of sorts σ1 . . . σk corresponds to the axiom
∀X1 ...Xkα(X1 . . . Xk)⇒ sortOf(X1, σ1) ∧· · ·∧ sortOf(Xk, σk).
(Note: The equality symbol X = Y has no sort declaration, so this axiom does not apply.)
SORT.2 The declaration of function symbol β as taking arguments of sorts σ1 . . . σk and returning a value of sort σ0 corresponds to the two axioms
∀X0,X1 ...Xk X0 = β(X1 . . . Xk) = ⊥⇒
sortOf(X1, σ1) ∧· · ·∧ sortOf(Xk, σk) ∧ sortOf(X0, σ0)
and
∀X0,X1 ...Xk sortOf(X1, σ1) ∧· · ·∧ sortOf(Xk, σk) ⇒ β(X1 . . . Xk) = ⊥
SORT.3 The declaration of constant symbol γ as having sort σ corresponds to the axiom
sortOf(γ ,σ )
SORT.4 ∀S ¬sortOf(⊥, S).
(The null element has no sort.)
SORT.5 subsort(S1, S2) ≡ ∀X sortOf(X, S1) ⇒ sortOf(X, S2).
(Deﬁnition of subsort.)
Table 2
Sorts and symbols for real arithmetic and set theory
Sorts:
Real numbers (X).
Integers (I). Subsort of reals.
Elements. (E)
Sets of elements (U ).
Symbols:
X1+ X2, X1− X2, X1 · X2, X1/X2, |X |, min(X1, X2), X1< X2, X1 X2, X1> X2, X1 X2.
∅, {E1, E2 . . . Ek}, E ∈ U , U1∪ U2, U1⊂ U2, U1− U2.
4.3. Time
Since this paper does not deal with the feasibility of actions, and since all the actions carried out consist of the exogenous
motion of solid objects, a very simple temporal ontology will suﬃce; there is a single time line, isomorphic to the real
numbers, and there are ﬂuents (functions of time) that take on different values at different times. Times and ﬂuents are
indeed the only temporal sorts that we will need. For brevity, we will treat times as real numbers, though of course a more
rigorous treatment would take “time” to be a separate sort which has a real-valued measure in a given temporal coordinate
system.
A ﬂuent is an entity that takes on a particular value at a particular time [30]. A Boolean ﬂuent such as “fullOfLiquid(R)”
(region R is full of liquid) is true or false at a time; a non-Boolean ﬂuent such as “place(O )” (the region occupied by object
O ) takes on values of some other sort. If a ﬂuent Q takes on values of sort σ , we denote the sort of Q as “ﬂuent[σ ]”;
e.g. grasping(A, O ) has sort ﬂuent[Bool] and place(O ) has sort ﬂuent[region]. In translating the sort language to the base
language, the symbol “ﬂuent” here is a function mapping a sort like “region” to the sort ﬂuent[region].
The temporal language is likewise simple and requiring only two primitives holds(T , Q ) and value(T , Q ) in addition to
the primitives over the reals. However, it is useful to have some additional deﬁned predicates as convenient abbreviations.
We assert two axioms of time in Table 3 (in addition to the implicit axioms of the real numbers). These are comprehen-
sion axioms for ﬂuents; they state that any deﬁnable property of time can be reiﬁed as a ﬂuent.
It will also be convenient to deﬁne some additional syntactic conventions for constructing functions over ﬂuents from
functions and predicates over atemporal entities. First, if X is an atemporal entity, then we deﬁne value(T , X) = X for all
times T ; that is, we conﬂate a ﬂuent that is constant with its value.
Let Φ(X1 : σ1 . . . Xk : σk) be a predicate (or equality sign) over atemporal sorts σ1 . . . σk . For i = 1 . . .k let Q i be a ﬂuent
of sort ﬂuent[σi]. Then we deﬁne Φ#(Q 1 . . . Qk) to be the Boolean ﬂuent satisfying
∀T :time holds (T ,Φ#(Q 1 . . . Qk))⇔Φ(value(T , Q 1) . . . value(T , Qk)).
Similarly let Ψ (X1 . . . Xk) : σ be a function with arguments of atemporal sorts σ1 . . . σk and value of sort σ . Then
Ψ #(Q 1 . . . Qk) is the ﬂuent of sort ﬂuent[σ ] satisfying
∀T :time value (T ,Ψ #(Q 1 . . . Qk)) = Ψ (value(T , Q 1) . . . value(T , Qk)).
Finally, if  is a Boolean operator then # is the corresponding function over Boolean ﬂuents (used with the same
syntax as the operator). That is,
∀T :time holds(T , Q 1#Q 2)⇔[holds(T , Q 1) holds(T , Q 2)].
For example, if Q 1 and Q 2 are ﬂuents whose value at each time is a set, then “Q 1=# ∅” is the Boolean ﬂuent that holds
at those times where Q 1 is empty. “Q 1⊂# Q 2” is the Boolean ﬂuent that holds when Q 1 is a subset of Q 2. “Q 1∪# Q 2”
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Temporal theory: Proper axioms
Sorts:
Time (T ) = real.
Fluent (Q ).
Symbols:
holds(T : time, Q : ﬂuent[Bool]). Boolean ﬂuent Q holds at time T .
value(T : time, Q : ﬂuent[γ ]) → γ .
The value of non-Boolean ﬂuent Q at time T . γ is a meta-variable ranging over sorts.
throughout(T1, T2:time, Q : ﬂuent[Bool]). Boolean ﬂuent Q holds from T1 to T2 inclusive.
throughoutxE(T1, T2:time, Q :ﬂuent). Boolean ﬂuent Q holds from T1 until T2 but possibly not at
T2.
foreverAfter(T :time, Q :ﬂuent). Fluent Q holds from time T onward.
eventuallyForever(Q :ﬂuent). Q eventually becomes true and remains true forever.
Deﬁnitions:
TD.1 throughout(T1, T2, Q ) ≡ ∀T T1 T  T2 ⇒ holds(T , Q ).
TD.2 throughoutxE(T1, T2, Q ) ≡ ∀T T1 T < T2 ⇒ holds(T , Q ).
TD.3 foreverAfter(T , Q ) ≡ ∀T1 T  T1 ⇒ holds(T1, Q ).
TD.4 eventuallyForever(Q ) ≡ ∃T1∀T2 T1< T2⇒ holds(T2, Q ).
Axioms:
T.1 Let Φ(T ) be an open formula where T is a variable of sort “time” such that the variable Q does not appear free in Φ . Then the following is
an axiom:
∃Q ∀T :time holds(T , Q ) ⇔ Φ(T ).
T.2 Let Φ(X, T ) be an open formula where T is a variable of sort “time”, and X is an atemporal variable (i.e. not of sort “time” or “ﬂuent”) such
that the variable Q does not appear free in Φ . Then the following is an axiom:
[∀T :time ∃X Φ(X, T )] ⇒ ∃Q ∀T :time Φ(value(T , Q ),T ).
is the ﬂuent whose value at each time S is the union of the values of Q 1 and Q 2. “Q 1⊂# Q 2∨# Q 2⊂# Q 1” is the ﬂuent
that holds at all times in which either Q 1 is a subset of Q 2 or Q 2 is a subset of Q 1.
4.4. Space
The ontology we use for space is Euclidean geometry (3). Our discussion here is entirely ad hoc for the example of
pouring liquids from one container to another. That is, Table 4 enumerates the sorts and the predicates that we use in the
physical axioms of Sections 4.5–4.9; it does not attempt any systematic discussion of geometric reasoning. In our formal
proof, we will cite standard or easily proven geometric theorems as needed.
We use the following geometric sorts: distance, height (abbreviated “ht”), volume, point,, point set, vector, region, bregion,
and rigid mapping. The general category “geometric entity” includes points, point sets, vectors, regions, bregions, and rigid
mappings.
It is useful to posit a standard unit length and a standard coordinate system, with a vertical z-axis. Relative to these,
“distance”, “height” and “volume” can be considered subsorts of the real numbers.
A point set is any non-empty set of points. The exclusion of empty point sets together with our rule excluding partial
functions means that many useful functions such as intersection have to be deﬁned as predicates. (Including empty point
sets would necessitate adding the condition “P S is non-empty” to all kinds of logical statements; my feeling is that overall
it is about an even trade-off.)
A region is a topologically regular point set. A region need not be either bounded or connected. A bregion is a bounded
(but not necessarily connected) region.
A rigid mapping is a positive, orthonormal mapping of three-dimensional space to itself; that is, the composition of a
rotation and a translation. (Reﬂections are not allowed.)
The other geometric sorts are self-explanatory.
The large number of geometric sorts that we use here may surprise readers who are used to more ontologically pure
theories, in which the only geometric sort allowed is the sort of well-behaved, fully dimensional regions. However, it turns
out that, strictly speaking, the greater ontological proﬂigacy here is illusory. Speciﬁcally, if you have a ﬁrst-order language
that allows quantiﬁcation over regions, then even if you restrict the language to the single predicate “closer(X, Y , Z )”,
meaning “region X is closer to Y than to Z ” and you restrict the universe of entities to include only simple polygons,
nonetheless all of these ontological categories and the whole range of standard geometric concepts can be deﬁned as ﬁrst-
order constructions in this language [10].
Because of the large number of geometric sorts, we are less systematic about the use of initial letters to indicate sort
of variables. In most cases, variables of sort “region” start with R; points start with start with P ; pointSets start with P S;
rigid mappings start with M; distances start with D; other geometric variables start with G .
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Spatial sorts and symbols
Sorts:
distance. subsort(distance,real).
ht (height). subsort(ht,real).
geomEntity (G). Any geometric entity.
point (P ). subsort(point,geomEntity). subsort(point,element).
pointSet (P S). subsort(pointSet,set). subsort(pointSet,geomEntity).
vector. subsort(vector,geomEntity).
region (R). subsort(region,pointSet).
bregion(R). subsort(bregion,region)
rigidMapping (M). subsort(rigidMapping,geomEntity).
Symbols: (These are mostly explained in the text.)
rccC(R1, R2: region).
rccEC(R1, R2: region).
rccDS(R1, R2: region).
rccO(R1, R2: region).
rccNTPP(R1, R2: region).
bounded(P S:pointSet).
mappingImage(M :rigidMapping, G: geomEntity) → geomEntity. The image of G under M .
interior(P S:region) → pointSet. The topological interior of P S .
boundary(R:region) → pointSet. The topological boundary surface of R (R-interior(R)).
diameter(R: bregion) → distance.
zˆ: vector. The absolute upward direction.
pointAbove(P1, P2: point). P1 is vertically above P2.
height(P : point) → ht.
bottom(R: bregion) → ht. The minimum value of height(P ) for P ∈ R .
top(R: bregion) → ht. The maximum value of height(P ) for P ∈ R .
openBox(RB:region, R I: bregion).
thicklyConnected(R:region)
volumeOf(R:bregion) → volume.
topPoint(P :point, R:region).
bottomPoint(P :point, R:region).
weakTopPoint(P :point,R:region).
dist(P1, P2:point) → distance.
dist(P S1, P S2:pointSet) → distance.
xyProj(P S: pointSet) → pointSet.
regDif(R1, R2, RD:region)
regCompl(R1, R2:region)
regInt(R1, R2, R I:region)
hausdorff1(P S1, P S2:pointSet, D:distance).
hausdorff(P S1, P S2:pointSet, D:distance).
expand(P S:pointSet, D:distance) → pointSet.
lineSeg(P S:pointSet,P A, P B:point)
upExpand(P S:pointSet, D:distance, R, RE:region).
We use some of the RCC [29] topological relations between regions. However, since our vocabulary of symbols is so
large, we preface the name with “rcc". Thus, the predicate “rccC(R1, R2)” is the relation usually designated “C(R1, R2)” in
the qualitative spatial reasoning literature; namely, regions R1 and R2 are connected. Similarly “rccEC(R1, R2)” is the QSR
relation EC(R1, R2), R1 and R2 are externally connected; “rccDS(R1, R2)” is the QSR relation DS(R1, R2), R1 and R2 are
disjoint (either disconnected or externally connected); “rccO(R1, R2)” is the QSR relation O(R1, R2), R1 and R2 overlap; and
“rccNTPP(R1, R2)” is the QSR relation NTPP(R1, R2), R1 is a non-tangential proper part of R2. The RCC relations are only
applied to regions, not to other point sets.
The function “mappingImage(M,G)” denotes the image of G under rigid mapping M . The sort of mappingImage(M,G) is
the same as the sort of G (in other words, all our geometric sorts are closed under rigid mappings).
The predicates “regDif(R1, R2, RD)”, “regCompl(R1, RC )”, and “regInt(R1, R2, R I)” assert that RD is the regularized dif-
ference of R1 and R2, RC is the regularized complement of R1, and R I is the regularized intersection of R1 and R2.
The predicate “openBox(RB, R I)” is the geometric equivalent of the deﬁnition of a “cupped” region in Deﬁnition 3.2.3.
It holds for regions RB, R I if R I is thickly connected; RB and R I are disjoint; and every boundary point of R I either has
height equal to top(R I) or is a boundary point of RB .
The predicate “diameter(P S, X )” means that X is the diameter of point set P S; that is, the least upper bound on
distance(P1, P2) where P1, P2 are points in P S . If P S is unbounded, then this does not hold for any X .
The predicate “topPoint(P , R)” holds if point P is a boundary point of R and there is a vertical line segment upward
from P that lies outside R . The predicate “bottomPoint(P , R)” is deﬁned analogously. The predicate “weakTopPoint(P , R)”
holds if P is a boundary point of R and there is a vertical line segment upward from P that does not enter the interior of
R (but may lie in the boundary of R).
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Some spatial deﬁnitions
Deﬁnitions:
SD.1 bregion(R) ≡ region(R) ∧ bounded(R).
SD.2 localMin(P , P S) ≡
∃D D > 0 ∧ ∀P1∈P S dist(P , P1)< D ⇒ height(P )height(P1).
SD.3 bottom(R) = H ≡ [∃P∈R height(P )=H)] ∧ [∀P∈R height(P ) H)].
SD.4 top(R) = H ≡ [∃P∈R height(P )=H)] ∧ [∀P∈R height(P ) H)].
SD.5 topPoint(P , R) ≡
P ∈boundary(R)) ∧
∃D1:distance 0< D1 ∧ ∀D2:distance,P∈P S 0< D2< D1 ⇒ P + D2 · zˆ ∈ R .
SD.6 bottomPoint(P , R) ≡
P ∈boundary(R)) ∧
∃D1:distance 0< D1 ∧ ∀D2:distance,P∈P S 0< D2< D1 ⇒ P − D2 · zˆ ∈ R .
SD.7 dist(P S1, P S2)=D ≡
[ ∀P1∈P S1,P2∈P S2 dist(P1, P2)  D] ∧
[∀D1 D1> D ⇒ ∃P1∈P S1,P2∈P S2 dist(P1, P2) < D1].
SD.8 regDif(R1, R2, R3) ≡
∀R:region R ⊂ R3 ⇔ R ⊂ R1 ∧ rccDS(R, R2).
Table 6
More spatial deﬁnitions
SD.9 regCompl(R1, R2) ≡ ∀R:region R ⊂ R2 ⇔ rccDS(R, R1).
SD.10 regInt(R1, R2, R3) ≡ ∀R:region R ⊂ R3 ⇔ R ⊂ R1 ∧ R ⊂ R2.
SD.11 openBox(RB, R I) ≡
thicklyConnected(R I) ∧
[∀P P ∈boundary(R I) ⇒ top(R I)=height(P )) ∨ P ∈boundary(RB)]
SD.12 pointAbove(P A, P B) ≡
∃D 0 D ∧ P A = P B + D · zˆ.
SD.13 hausdorff1(P S1, P S2, D) ≡
[ ∀P1∈P S1 dist(P1, P S2)  D] ∧
[∀D1 D1< D ⇒ ∃P1∈P S1 dist(P1, P S2) > D1].
SD.14 hausdorff(P S1, P S2, D) ≡
∃D1,D2 hausdorff1(P S1, P S2, D1) ∧ hausdorff1(P S2, P S1, D2) ∧ D =max(D1, D2).
SD.15 weakTopPoint(P , R) ≡
P ∈boundary(R)) ∧
∃D1:distance 0< D1 ∧ ∀D2:distance,P∈P S 0< D2< D1 ⇒ P + D2 · zˆ ∈interior(R).
SD.16 P ∈expand(P S, D) ⇔ dist(P , P S)  D .
SD.17 upExpand(P S, D, R, RE) ≡
∀P P ∈ RE ⇔
∃P A,P L P A ∈ P S ∧ lineSeg(P L, P A, P ) ∧ P L ∈ R ∧
height(P )  height(P A) ∧ dist(P , P A)  D .
The predicates “hausdorff1(P S1, P S2, D)” and “hausdorff(P S1, P S2, D)” assert that D is the one-sided Hausdorff dis-
tance/the true Hausdorff distance between point sets P S1 and P S2. They are deﬁned as predicates, because they may be
undeﬁned (i.e. inﬁnite) for unbounded point sets.
The function “xyProj(P S)” is the projection of point set P S in the standard coordinate system.
The function “expand(P S, D)” is the set of all points within distance D of some point in P S . The predicate
“upExpand(P S, D, R, RE)” states that RE is the upward expansion of point set P S by distance D through region R; that
is, RE is the set of all points P such that there is a point P A in P S within distance D of P such that the line segment from
P to P A goes through R and P is at least as high as P A.
The meanings of the remaining symbols in Table 4 are immediate. Functions and predicates deﬁned over point sets are
overloaded to apply to individual points by coercing the point P to the point set {P }. Tables 5 and 6 give formal deﬁnitions
of non-standard symbols.
4.5. Ontology
There are two basic kinds of physical entities in our theory. An object is a rigid solid object.
A liquid chunk is a piece of liquid. Think of it as an abstraction of a set of particular molecules. At any time, any bounded
region, connected or disconnected, which is ﬁlled with liquid has a corresponding liquid chunk. Each liquid chunk is eternal.
The volume of liquid chunk L, denoted “liqVolume(L)” is constant over time. The set theoretic relation between two liquid
chunks is constant over time; in particular, the atemporal relation “subchunk(L1, L2)” asserts that L1 is a subset of L2.
In physical reasoning about solid objects it is often useful to be able to reify pseudo-objects [4]; geometric entities that
“move around” with an object, such as the center of mass of an object, the hole of a donut, the apex of a cone, and so on.
The source of pseudo-object B is the object to which B is “attached”.
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Ontology: Sorts and symbols
Sorts:
movableEntity(G).
gObject (G). Subsort of movableEntity.
object (O ). Subsort of gObject.
pseudo (B). Subsort of gObject.
liquidChunk (L). Subsort of movableEntity.
objectSet(U ). Subsort of set.
Symbols:
place(G: movableEntity) → ﬂuent[geomEntity].
source(G: gObject) → object.
shape(G: gObject) → geomEntity.
placement(G: gObject) → ﬂuent[rigidMapping].
motionless(O :object) → ﬂuent[Bool]
liquidSpace → ﬂuent[region].
solidSpace → ﬂuent[region].
solidFreeSpace → ﬂuent[region].
subChunk(L1, L: liquidChunk).
liqVolume(L:liquidChunk) → volume.
fullOfLiquid(R:region) → ﬂuent[Bool].
empty(R: region) → ﬂuent[Bool].
emptyLiquid(R:region) → ﬂuent[Bool].
Table 8
Ontology: Deﬁnitions and axioms
Deﬁnitions:
ONTD.1 fullOfLiquid(R) = R ⊂#liquidSpace.
ONTD.2 emptyLiquid(R) = rccDS#(R ,liquidSpace)
ONTD.3 holds(T , P ∈#solidSpace) ≡ ∃O :object holds(T , P ∈# ↑O ).
ONTD.4 solidFreeSpace = regCompl#(solidSpace).
ONTD.5 empty(R) = emptyLiquid(R) ∧# R ⊂#solidFreeSpace.
ONTD.6 objectSet(U ) ∧ O ∈ U ⇒ object(O ).
Axioms:
ONT.1 object(O ) ⇒ source(O )=O .
ONT.2 gObject(G) ⇒ placement(G) = placement(source(G)).
ONT.3 object(O ) ⇒ bregion(shape(O )).
ONT.4 gObject(G) ⇒ value(T ,place(G)) = mappingImage(value(T ,placement(G)),shape(G)).
ONT.5 ∀T :time,L1,L2:liquidChunk subChunk(L1, L2) ⇔ holds(T ,↑L1⊂# ↑L2)
ONT.6 bregion(R) ∧ holds(T ,fullOfLiquid(R)) ⇒ ∃1L:liquidChunk value(T ,↑L) = R .
ONT.7 ∀T :time,L:liquidChunk holds(T ,bregion#(↑L)∧# ↑L ⊂#liquidSpace)
ONT.8 throughout(T1, T2,motionless(O )) ⇔ ∃P throughout(T1, T2,P =#placement(O )).
Since objects, pseudo-objects, and liquid chunks have important properties in common, it will be convenient to group
these into supersorts and deﬁne these properties over the supersorts. A generalized object (gObject) is either an object or a
pseudo-object, and a movable entity is either an object, a pseudo-object or a liquid chunk.
We characterize an object O and its associated pseudo-objects in terms of an arbitrary standard position. The shape of O
is the region that it occupies in its standard position. The shape of pseudo-object Q is the geometric entity that instantiates
Q when O is in its standard position.
The position of an object O at a given time T is speciﬁed by a rigid mapping from its standard position to its posi-
tion at T , denoted value(T ,placement(O )). The region occupied by O at time T is thus the image of shape(O ) under the
mapping value(T ,placement(O )); this is denoted value(T ,place(O )). The same holds for pseudo-objects. The constraint that
a pseudo-object must move around with its source is expressed by axiom ONT.2, which states that, for any pseudo-object
B , placement(B) = placement(source(B)).
Similarly, if L is a liquid chunk, then the ﬂuent “place(L)” is the region occupied by L at each time T .
Since the function place(E) is used so frequently in our theory, we abbreviate it using the symbol ↑E . For example, the
formula, “holds(T ,rccEC#(↑O ,↑L))” is an abbreviation for “holds(T ,rccEC#(place(O ), place(L)))”, meaning that O and L are
externally connected at time T .
The constants “liquidSpace” and “solidSpace” denote the ﬂuents corresponding to all of the space in the world occupied
by liquid/solids at a given time. The constant “solidFreeSpace” denotes the ﬂuent corresponding to all the space not in
the interior of a solid at a given time. The function “fullOfLiquid(R)” denotes the Boolean ﬂuent that holds at time T if
R is full of liquid. The function “empty(R)” holds when the interior of R is empty of both liquids and solids. The ﬂuent
“emptyLiquid(R)” holds when the interior of R is empty of liquid but not necessarily of solids.
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Continuity
Symbols:
continuous(Q :ﬂuent[real], T S, T E:time)
continuousPoint(Q :ﬂuent[point], T S, T E:time)
continuousPlacement(Q :ﬂuent[rigidMapping], T S, T E:time)
volumeDiff(R1, R2:bregion) → volume
volumeSymDiff(R1, R2:bregion) → volume
continuousVolume(Q :ﬂuent[bregion], T S, T E:time)
continuousHausdorff(Q :ﬂuent[pointSet], T S, T E:time)
Deﬁnitions:
CONTD.1 continuous(Q , T S, T E) ≡
∀E E > 0 ⇒
∃D D > 0 ∧
∀T1,T2 T S  T1< T2 T E ∧ T2− T1< D ⇒
|value(T1, Q )−value(T2, Q )| < E .
CONTD.2 continuousPoint(Q , T S, T E) ≡
∀E E > 0 ⇒
∃D D > 0 ∧
∀T1,T2 T S  T1< T2 T E ∧ T2− T1< D ⇒
dist(value(T1, Q ),value(T2, Q )) < E
CONTD.3 continuousPlacement(Q , T S, T E) ≡
∀P continuousPoint(mappingImage#(Q , P ), T S, T E).
CONTD.4 volumeDiff(R1, R2)=V ⇔
[R1⊂ R2 ∧ V = 0] ∨ [∃R3 regDif(R1, R2, R3) ∧ V = volumeOf(R3)].
CONTD.5 volumeSymDiff(R1, R2) = volumeDif(R1, R2) + volumeDif(R2, R1).
CONTD.6 continuousVolume(Q , T S, T E) ≡
∀E E > 0 ⇒
∃D D > 0 ∧
∀T1,T2 T S  T1< T2 T E ∧ T2− T1< D ⇒
volumeSymDiff(value(T1, Q ),value(T2, Q )) < E
CONTD.7 continuousHausdorff(Q , T S, T E) ≡
∀E E > 0 ⇒
∃D D > 0 ∧
∀T1,T2 T S  T1< T2 T E ∧ T2− T1< D ⇒
∃E1 hausdorff(value(T1, Q ),value(T2, Q ),E1) ∧ E1< E .
Tables 7 and 8 present ontological deﬁnitions and axioms. ONT.4 asserts that the place occupied by any object or pseudo-
object G is the image of shape(G) under the rigid mapping placement(G). Since shape(G) is constant over time rather than
a ﬂuent, this implies that objects are rigid. ONT.2 asserts that the placement of a pseudo-object is equal to the placement
of a source, guaranteeing that the pseudo-object moves around with the corresponding object. ONT.6 asserts that at a given
time the region occupied by liquid chunk L1 is a subset of the region occupied by liquid chunk L2 just if L1 is a subchunk
of L2; since subchunk is not time-dependent, this means that the set theoretical relations among chunks are constant over
time. ONT.7 and ONT.8 assert that every bounded region ﬁlled with water corresponds to a liquid chunk, and conversely.
4.6. Kinematics
We begin with the representation of Rules 1, 2, and 3, called the kinematic constraints. In the domain of solid object
mechanisms, reasoning purely with kinematic constraints is an important category of reasoning; there are many mechanisms
whose workings can be explained largely or entirely on kinematic principles [22]. In the domain of liquids, purely kinematic
reasoning is much less important because the class of kinematic behaviors is much less constrained. Nonetheless, these are
very important constraints, because they always apply, as long as the idealizations that objects are rigid and liquids are
incompressible are valid.
Table 9 deﬁnes the concepts of continuity that we will need, as in Section 3.7. Solid objects have a continuous placement
function; liquid chunks are volume-continuous and almost everywhere Hausdorff-continuous.
Table 10 contains the kinematic axioms. Deﬁnition KIND.2 deﬁnes a liquid chunk L having “simple ﬂow” of diameter
D between times T S and T E as in Deﬁnition 3.7.5. Axiom KIN.1 asserts that no two solid objects overlap. Axiom KIN.2
asserts that no liquid overlaps a solid object. Axiom KIN.3 asserts that a liquid chunk always occupies a volume equal to
its inherent volume; thus liquids are incompressible. Axiom KIN.4 asserts that the place of every liquid chunk is volume
continuous. Axiom KIN.5 asserts that every liquid chunk has a subchunk with simple ﬂow of arbitrarily small diameter.
4.7. Overﬂow
Table 11 gives the formal statement of Deﬁnition 3.3.3 of “driven” liquids, since that category is needed as an exception
to Rules 4, 5, and 6,
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Kinematics
Symbols:
simpleFlow(L:liquidChunk, D:distance, T S, T E:time)
Deﬁnitions:
KIND.1 simpleFlow(L, D, T S, T E) ≡
continuousHausdorff(↑L, T S, T E) ∧
throughout(T S, T E ,thicklyConnected#(↑L) ∧# diameter#(↑L) <# D)
Axioms:
KIN.1 ∀O1,O2:object,T :time O1 = O2 ⇒ holds(T , rccDS#(↑O1,↑O2))
(Two objects O1 and O2 do not overlap at any time T .)
KIN.2 ∀O :object,L:liquidChunk,T :time holds(T , rccDS#(↑O ,↑L))
(An object O does not overlap a liquid chunk L at time T .)
KIN.3 ∀L:liquidChunk,T :time volumeOf(value(T ,↑L)) = liqVolume(L).
(The volume of a liquid chunk L is constant.)
KIN.4 ∀L:liquidChunk,T S,T E:time continuousVolume(↑L, T S, T E)
KIN.5 ∀L:liquidChunk,T S,T E:time,D:distance
D > 0 ⇒
∃L1:liquidChunk subchunk(L1, L) ∧ simpleFlow(L1, D, T S, T E).
(Liquids ﬂow continuously, as described in the text.)
Table 11
Overﬂow
Symbols:
localMaxBox(RB:region,R I:bregion) → ﬂuent[Bool].
localMaxCup(R:bregion) → ﬂuent[Bool].
monotonic(Q :ﬂuent[real], T S, T E:time, X:real).
monotonicPreﬁx(Q :ﬂuent[real], T S:time).
simpleOverﬂows(L:liquidChunk, Q : ﬂuent[bregion], T S, T E: history)
drivenReg(R:bregion) → ﬂuent[Bool].
driven(L:liquidChunk) → ﬂuent[Bool].
SPILLD.1 localMaxBox(RB, R I) ≡
openBox(RB, R I) ∧
∃D D > 0 ∧
∀R1 openBox(RB, R1) ∧ R I ⊂ R1 ∧ R = R1 ⇒
∃P∈R1 dist(P , R I) > D .
SPILLD.2 localMaxCup(R) = localMaxBox#(solidSpace,R).
SPILLD.3 monotonic(Q , T S, T E, X) ≡
T S < T E ∧
∀T1,T2 T S  T1< T2 T E ⇒
[[X = 0 ∧ value(T2, Q ) = value(T1, Q )] ∨
X ·(value(T2, Q ) − value(T1, Q )) > 0].
SPILLD.4 monotonicPreﬁx(Q , T S) ≡ ∃T E,X monotonic(Q , T S, T E, X).
SPILLD.5 simpleOverﬂows(L, Q , T S, T E) ≡
holds(T S,↑L =# Q ) ∧
throughout(T S, T E, localMaxCup#(Q )) ∧ continuousVolume(Q , T S, T E) ∧
monotonic(volumeOf#(Q ), T S, T E,−1)
SPILLD.6 holds(T ,drivenReg(R)) ⇔
∃LO ,Q O ,T S,T E,RE T S  T  T E ∧
simpleOverﬂow(LO , Q O , T S, T E) ∧ R ⊂ RE ∧
holds(T , thicklyConnected#(R ∪ ↑LO ) ∧#
upExpand#(topSurface#(Q O ), maxOutﬂow, solidFreeSpace, RE))
SPILLD.7 holds(T ,driven(L)) ⇔
∃R holds(T ,drivenReg(R) ∧# ↑L ⊂# R)
Axioms:
SPILL.1 throughout(T S, T E ,localMaxCup#(Q )) ∧ continuousVolume(Q , T S, T E) ⇒
monotonicPreﬁx(volumeOf(Q ),T S).
Deﬁnitions SPILLD.1 and SPILLD.2 deﬁne “locally maximal cup” as in Deﬁnition 3.3.1. Deﬁnition SPILLD.3 deﬁnes the
relation “monotonic(Q , T S, T E, X )”, meaning that ﬂuent Q is monotonic over interval [T S, T E] with sign X . If X is positive,
Q is strictly monotonically increasing; if X is negative, Q is strictly monotonically decreasing; if X is 0, Q is constant.
Deﬁnition SPILLD.5 deﬁnes the event of a cupped region overﬂowing. Let Q be a locally maximal cup throughout interval
[T S, T E] that is volume continuous. If liquid chunk L ﬁlls Q at T S and the volume of Q monotonically decreases during
[T S, T E], then Q overﬂows during [T S, T E]. The condition “continuousVolume(Q , H)” is required, ﬁrst to ensure that Q
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Flow
Symbols:
ﬂowsIn(L:liquidChunk, Q :ﬂuent[bregion], T S, T E: time)
ﬂowsOut(L:liquidChunk, Q :ﬂuent[bregion], T S, T E: time)
noInﬂow(Q :ﬂuent[bregion], T S, T E: time)
noInﬂowDuring(Q :ﬂuent[bregion], T S, T E: time)
noOutﬂow(Q :ﬂuent[bregion], T S, T E: time)
Deﬁnitions:
FLOWD.1 ﬂowsIn(L, Q , T S, T E) ≡
holds(T S, rccDS#(↑L, Q )) ∧ holds(T E,↑L ⊂# Q ).
FLOWD.2 ﬂowsOut(L, Q , T S, T E) ≡
holds(T S,↑L ⊂# Q ) ∧ holds(T E, rccDS#(↑L, Q )).
FLOWD.3 noInﬂow(Q , T S, T E) ≡ ¬∃L ﬂowsIn(L, Q , T S, T E).
FLOWD.4 noOutﬂow(Q , T S, T E) ≡ ¬∃L ﬂowsOut(L, Q , T S, T E).
FLOWD.5 noInﬂowDuring(Q , T S, T E) ≡
∀T1,T2 T S  T1< T2 T E ⇒ noInﬂow(Q , T1, T2).
Table 13
Cups
Symbols:
cuppedRegion(R:bregion) → ﬂuent[Bool]
motionlessLiquidIn(R:bregion) → ﬂuent[Bool].
slowObjectMotion(O :object) → ﬂuent[Bool].
slowObjectsInContact(R:region) → ﬂuent[Bool].
motionlessObjectsInContact(R:region) → ﬂuent[Bool].
driven(L) → ﬂuent[Bool].
noDrivenLiqIn(R:region) → ﬂuent[Bool].
Deﬁnitions:
CUPD.1 cuppedRegion(R) = openBox#(solidSpace,R)
CUPD.2 holds(T ,slowObjectsInContact(R) ≡
∀O :object holds(T , rccC#(↑O , R)) ⇒ holds(T ,slowObjectMotion(O ))
CUPD.3 holds(T ,motionlessObjectsInContact(R)) ≡
∀O :object holds(T , rccC#(↑O , Q )) ⇒ holds(T ,motionless(O ))
CUPD.4 holds(T ,noDrivenLiqIn(R)) ≡
¬∃L holds(T , driven(L) ∧# ↑L ⊂# R).
Axioms:
CUP.1 throughout(T S, T E ,motionlessLiquidIn(Q )) ≡
T S < T E ∧
∀L:liquidChunk,T1,T2 T S  T1 T E ∧ T S  T2 T E ∧ holds(T1,↑L ⊂# Q ) ⇒
value(T2,↑L)=value(T1,↑L).
CUP.2 continuousVolume(Q , T S, T E) ∧
throughout(T S, T E , slowObjectsInContact(Q ) ∧# cuppedRegion(Q ) ∧#
¬#fullOfLiquid(Q ) ∧# noDrivenLiqIn(Q )) ⇒
noOutﬂow(Q , T S, T E).
CUP.3 ∀T S:time,R:bregion
[∀T1 T S  T1 ⇒
holds(T1, cuppedRegion(R) ∧# motionlessObjectsInContact(R)) ∧
noInﬂowDuring(R, T S, T1)] ⇒
eventuallyForever(motionlessLiquidIn(R)).
CUP.4 holds(T ,motionless(O )) ⇒ holds(T ,slowObjectMotion(O )).
does not simply “jump” from one cup to an entirely separate cup, and second to exclude the case where the extent of a
cupped region changes discontinuously, e.g. a plug is pulled from the side of a cup.
Deﬁnitions SPILLD.6 and SPILLD.7 deﬁnes a “driven region” and a “driven liquid” as in Deﬁnition 3.3.3.
Axiom SPILL.1 is required to exclude certain pathological scenarios. SPILLD.6 and SPILLD.7 assert that a liquid is driven
only while the corresponding cup is overﬂowing, and SPILLD.5 states that a cup overﬂows only over a history where its
volume decreases monotonically. However, there exist continuous real-valued functions—variants of the Cantor function—
which decrease between the start and end of an interval but do not monotonically decrease over any subinterval. If the
volume of a cupped region were to follow one of these, then SPILLD.5 would say that it never “overﬂows” even though the
volume of the cup has fallen below the volume of the liquid it contains. To rule this out, we assert the rather specialized
axiom SPILL.1 that if Q is a ﬂuent satisfying the conditions of SPILLD.5 (other than being ﬁlled with liquid) at time T1,
then volumeOf(Q ) has the “monotonic preﬁx property” deﬁned in SPILLD.4; there exists T2 > T1 such that volumeOf(Q )
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Downward ﬂow: Symbols
Symbols:
maxOutﬂow → distance.
obstacleSpace → ﬂuent[region].
weaklyCupped(L:liquidChunk) → ﬂuent[Bool].
nonFlowingSpace → ﬂuent[region].
ﬂowDisruptionReg(R:region) → ﬂuent[Bool].
ﬂowDisruptedSpace → ﬂuent[region].
ﬂowUndisruptedSpace → ﬂuent[region].
ﬂowStoppingPoint(P :point,R:region) → ﬂuent[Bool].
cantFlowDown(R:bregion) → ﬂuent[Bool].
canFlowDown(R:bregion) → ﬂuent[Bool].
ﬂowsDown(Q :ﬂuent[bregion], T S, T E:time).
ﬂowsStraightDown(L:liquidChunk, T S, T E:time).
connHorizOutslice(LA, LB:liquidChunk) → ﬂuent[Bool].
is monotonic over [T1, T2]. Essentially, this amounts to a well-behavedness condition on the shape and the motion of the
objects forming the cup. It is a quite weak condition; if the shapes and motions are semi-algebraic or probably even if they
are semi-analytic, then the condition is guaranteed.
4.8. Cupped liquid
Axiom CUP.1 is the formal statement of rule 4, the ﬁrst of our substantive dynamic rules: If, throughout an interval
[T S, T E] ﬂuent Q is always a cupped region, is continuous, and is never full of liquid, and if the objects in contact with
Q move slowly throughout [T S, T E], then there is no outﬂow from Q during [T S, T E]. The deﬁnition of “no outﬂow” and
other useful predicates associated with ﬂow are given in Table 12.
Axiom CUP.2 states a dynamic rule which we actually do not need for our pouring example here and did not discuss
in Section 3: If a ﬁxed region R is a cupped region forever after a starting time T S and the objects in contact with R are
motionless throughout forever, then eventually the liquid in R will likewise become motionless.
Axioms CUP.3–CUP.5 assert some basic properties of “slow object motion”: it is inherited by subhistories and by splicing,
and an object that is motionless is (so to speak) moving slowly.
4.9. Downward ﬂow
Finally, Tables 14–16 give the formal statement of our theory of downward ﬂow and rules 5 and 6 from Sections 3.4 and
3.5. Deﬁnitions DOWND.1–DOWND.5 deﬁne the concepts of weakly cupped liquids, nonFlowingSpace, ﬂowDisruptedSpace,
and ﬂowUndisruptedSpace, corresponding to Deﬁnitions 3.4.2, 3.5.1, and 3.5.2. Deﬁnitions DOWND.7–DOWND.9 deﬁne re-
gions that can and can’t ﬂow down, corresponding to Deﬁnitions 3.4.3 and 3.4.4. Deﬁnitions DOWND.10–DOWND.12 deﬁne
the event of a liquid ﬂowing down and ﬂowing straight down, corresponding to deﬁnitions 3.4.1 and 3.5.3. Deﬁnition
DOWND.13 deﬁnes the concept of a liquid slice with the same vertical span, used in Rule 5.
The deﬁnition of “ﬂowing straight down” given in Section 3.5 (Deﬁnition 3.5.3) was not quite adequate, and is corrected
here. The precise deﬁnition is given in DOWND.11 and DOWND.12. We say that a region-value ﬂuent Q ﬂows straight down
in history [T S, T E] if Q is continuous and ﬂows down and is always thickly connected and its projection on the xy plane
is constant. A piece of liquid L ﬂows straight down in [T S, T E] if L ﬂows down T S, T E , and at T E , the place of every
connected piece L2 of L is equal to the value in T E of some region-valued ﬂuent Q that has ﬂowed straight down in H and
has always been part of L in [T S, T E]. Note that Q does not have to correspond to L2 throughout [T S, T E]—that would
require the whole liquid to ﬂow vertically downward—but at each time T between T S and T E , Q corresponds to some part
of L. This condition excludes histories in which pieces of L could “sneak around” obstacles, getting underneath other pieces
of L that they are not actually connected to, which would satisfy Deﬁnition 3.5.3 as originally stated.
Axiom DOWN.2 states Rule 5: a liquid that can ﬂow down throughout an interval does ﬂow down. Axiom DOWN.3
states Rule 6: a liquid chunk in ﬂowUndisruptedSpace is part of a horizontal slice of the same vertical extent that ﬂows
straight down for some ﬁnite length of time. The horizontal slice may ﬂow into ﬂowDisruptedSpace—indeed, it may overlap
ﬂowDisruptedSpace even at the start—but it certainly does not stop ﬂowing straight down before it has come into contact
with ﬂowDisruptedSpace.
Axiom DOWN.4 prohibits the phenomenon of liquid ﬂow that is not Hausdorff continuous, discussed in Section 3.7, from
occurring in ﬂowUndisruptedSpace. Speciﬁcally it states that for any suﬃciently small interval [T S, T E], any liquid chunk
that is contained within ﬂowUndisruptedSpace at any time between T S and T E moves only a small Hausdorff distance
between T S and T E .
Axiom DOWN.5 states that if a region R never contains any cups, and there is no ﬂow into R , then all the liquid will
eventually ﬂow out of R .
Axiom DOWN.6 states that the downward velocity of any downward ﬂowing liquid L is faster than the downward velocity
of the top of any region ﬂuent Q which is a maximal cup of any slowly moving object. This is not literally true, but we use
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Downward ﬂow: Deﬁnitions
Deﬁnitions:
DOWND.1 holds(T ,P ∈#obstacleSpace) ⇔
∃G holds(T , P ∈# ↑G) ∧
[object(G) ∨
[liquidChunk(G) ∧
[holds(T ,cuppedRegion(↑G) ∨# driven(G))]]]
DOWND.2 weaklyCupped(L) = openBox#(obstacleSpace,↑L)
DOWND.3 holds(T ,P ∈#nonFlowingSpace) ⇔
holds(T ,P ∈#obstacleSpace) ∨ ∃Lholds(T ,weaklyCupped(L) ∧# P ∈# L).
DOWND.4 holds(T ,ﬂowDisruptionReg(R)) ≡
thicklyConnected(R) ∧ holds(T ,fullOfLiquid(R)) ∧
∀P∈R ∃P1∈R holds(T ,weakTopPoint#(P1,nonFlowingSpace) ∧
P ∈# upExpand#(P1,maxOutﬂow,solidFreeSpace)).
DOWND.5 holds(T ,P ∈#ﬂowDisruptedSpace) ≡
∃R P ∈ R ∧ holds(T ,ﬂowDisruptionReg(R)).
DOWND.6 ﬂowUndisruptedSpace = regCompl#(ﬂowDisruptedSpace ∪# nonFlowingSpace)
DOWND.7 ﬂowStoppingPoint(P , R) ≡
¬bottomPoint(P , R) ∧ localMin(P ,boundary(R)).
DOWND.8 holds(T ,cantFlowDown(R)) ⇔
[holds(T ,rccO#(R ,nonFlowingSpace)) ∨
[∃P bottomPoint(P , R) ∧ holds(T , ﬂowStoppingPoint#(P ,nonFlowingSpace))]]
DOWND.9 canFlowDown(R) = ¬#cantFlowDown(R).
DOWND.10 ﬂowsDown(Q , T S, T E) ≡
∀T1,T2 T S  T1< T2 T E ⇒
value(T2,top#(Q )) < value(T1,top#(Q )) ∧
value(T2,bottom#(Q )) < value(T1,bottom#(Q ))
DOWND.11 qFlowsStraightDown(Q , T S, T E) ≡
continuousVolume(Q , T S, T E) ∧ ﬂowsDown(Q , T S, T E) ∧
throughout(T S, T E ,thicklyConnected#(Q )) ∧
∃P S1:pointSet throughout(T S, T E ,P S1=# xyProj#(Q ))
DOWND.12 ﬂowsStraightDown(L, T S, T E) ≡
ﬂowsDown(L, T S, T E) ∧
∀T2,L2 T S  T2 T E ∧ subchunk(L2, L) ∧ holds(T2,thicklyConnected#(↑L2)) ⇒
∃Q 2 qFlowsStraightDown(Q 2, T S, T2) ∧
holds(T2, Q 2=# ↑L2) ∧ throughout(T S, T2, Q 2⊂# ↑L).
DOWND.13 holds(T ,connHorizOutslice(LA, LB)) ⇔
subchunk(LA, LB) ∧
holds(T , thicklyConnected#(↑LB)∧#
top#(↑LA) =# top#(↑LB)∧# bottom#(↑LA) =# bottom#(↑LB))
it to exclude a scenario in which one pours liquid of a cup and catches it again in the same cup.7 Note that “slow moving”
must actually exclude downward acceleration that is faster than gravitational acceleration, or axiom CUP.2 would be false.
Axiom DOWN.6 approximates this constraint on acceleration with a similar constraint on velocity, since we do not deal with
acceleration in this paper.
5. Problem speciﬁcation
In this section, we translate the commonsense inference, “If a partially full pitcher is lifted over a pail and tilted far
enough, some of the liquid will pour from the pitcher to the pail”, into a formal speciﬁcation and a conclusion that is
a logical consequence of the speciﬁcation and the theory presented above. In particular, we must specify the necessary
geometric constraints on the pitcher, the pail, and the motion of the pitcher.
This is a more problematic undertaking than one might suppose. It seems plausible to assume that the speciﬁcations of
individual inference problems will consist entirely or largely of a set of sentences of simple logical form over a ﬁxed and
ﬁnite language. Determining what concepts should be included in that language is a large part of the research enterprise.
That is to say, we need to determine what concepts are important in specifying individual inference problems; this is a
different and probably larger set than the concepts needed to state the general theory. The concepts themselves are deﬁned
in terms of the theoretical temporal, spatial, and physical primitives. These deﬁnitions may be of arbitrary logical complexity,
but hopefully they will eventually be a ﬁxed and ﬁnite collection. We have followed this structure in our speciﬁcations,
giving the deﬁnitions in Tables 17 and 18, and the scenario description in Table 19; note that the scenario description is
effectively a conjunction of ground atomic formulas.
7 One of the reviewers of this paper, who is more agile than the author, remarks that he/she has actually succeeded in doing this.
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Downward ﬂow: Axioms
Axioms:
DOWN.1 maxOutﬂow > 0.
DOWN.2 liquidChunk(L) ∧
throughout(T S, T E ,slowObjectsInContact(↑L) ∧# canFlowDown(↑L)) ⇒
ﬂowsDown(↑L,T S, T E)
DOWN.3 liquidChunk(L) ∧ throughout(T S, T E ,slowObjectsInContact(↑L)) ∧
holds(T S,↑L ⊂#ﬂowUndisruptedSpace) ⇒
∃T X,LX T S < T X ∧
holds(T S ,connHorizOutslice(L, LX) ∧# rccDS#(↑LX ,nonFlowingSpace)) ∧
ﬂowsStraightDown(LX, T S, T X) ∧ holds(T X, rccC#(↑LX ,ﬂowDisruptedSpace)).
DOWN.4 ∀T S,T E:time T S < T E ∧ bregion(R) ∧ distance(D) ∧ D > 0 ⇒
∃T1 T S < T1 T E ∧
∀L:liquidChunk,T
T S  T  T1 ∧ holds(T , ↑L ⊂#ﬂowUndisruptedSpace ∧# ↑L ⊂# R) ⇒
∃D1 hausdorff(value(T ,↑L),value(T S,↑L),D1) ∧ D1< D .
DOWN.5 ∀T S:time,R:bregion
[∀T E,RC T S  T E ∧ RC ⊂ R ⇒
noInﬂowDuring(R, T S, T E) ∧ ¬holds(T E ,cuppedRegion(RC))]
⇒
eventuallyForever(emptyLiquid(R)).
DOWN.6 liquidChunk(L) ∧ ﬂowsDown(↑L, T S, T E) ∧ continuousVolume(Q IN, T S, T E) ∧
throughout(T S, T E , slowObjectMotion(O B) ∧# localMaxBox#(↑O B, Q IN) ∧#
rccDS#(↑L,nonFlowingSpace)) ⇒
value(T S, top#(Q IN)) − value(T E, top#(Q IN)) 
value(T S, top#(L)) − value(T E, top#(L)).
Table 17
Problem speciﬁcation: Symbols
Symbols:
oPitcher, oPail → object.
bInsidePitcher, bSpout, bTopPitcher → pseudo.
l0 → liquidChunk.
t0,t1,t2 → time.
topSurface(P S:pointSet, R:region)
partialBox(RB, R I1, R I2, RO P EN: bregion, D:distance)
spout1(RB, R I1, R I2, RS P OU T , RO P EN:region,D:distance)
spout(RS P OU T , RB:bregion, D;distance).
pitcherShape(RO B, R IN:bregion, P T O P :pointSet ,RS P OU T :bregion).
pitcher(O P :object, B I, BT , BS:pseudo) → ﬂuent[Bool].
volumeBelow(R:region, Z :ht) → volume
psBottom(P S:pointSet, Z :ht).
simpleSafeTilt(B IN, BT O P : pseudo, V : volume)
alwaysSimpleBox(RB: region)
passOverBox(P AS S:pointSet, RBO X, R IN:region)
upColumn(P S:pointSet, Z :ht, P SC :pointSet).
pouringRegion → ﬂuent[region].
simpleBox(R:region).
convexHull(P S:pointSet) → pointSet.
isolated(R:region, U :objectSet, L:liquidChunk) → ﬂuent[Bool].
maxBox(RB, R I:region).
horizExpand(P S:pointSet, D:distance) → pointSet.
Turning now to the details of the speciﬁcations: There are two objects oPitcher and oPail, and a liquid chunk l0. There
are three pseudo-objects associated with oPitcher: bInsidePitcher, the inside of the pitcher at the starting time, bTopPitcher,
the top surface of bInsidePitcher, and bSpout, the spout (PS.3, PS.4). Initially all the liquid l0 is inside bInsidePitcher (PS.5).
There are three distinguished time points: t0, t1, and t2 (PS.1). At the starting time t0, the pitcher is an open box (PS.3)
and contains the liquid l0 (PS.4).
From t0 to t1, the pitcher is moved slowly (PS.7) to a position where its spout is over oPail, being kept reasonably upright
throughout (PS.8).
From t2 to t3, the pitcher is tipped to a ﬁnal position where the volume it can contain is less than the volume of l0.
After t3, it remains motionless forever in its pouring position (PS.17). Since the pitcher remains motionless after t3, any
geometric property that holds in t3 continues to hold after t3.
PS.6 speciﬁes that the bottom of bTopPitcher is always above the bottom of bInsidePitcher. This guarantees that there is
always some cupped region inside the pitcher, and thus that some of l0 remains inside the pitcher.
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Problem speciﬁcation: Deﬁnitions
Deﬁnitions:
PD.1 bubbleFreeAttachment(R A, RB) ≡
rccEC(R A, RB) ∧
¬∃R rccEC(R, R A) ∧ rccDS(R, RB) ∧
boundary(R) ⊂ boundary(R A) ∪ boundary(RB) ∧
¬[boundary(R) ⊂ boundary(RB)].
PD.2 topSurface(P S, R) ≡ ∀P P ∈ P S ⇔ topPoint(P , R).
PD.3 partialBox(RB, R I1, R I2, RO P EN, D) ≡
localMaxBox(RB, R I1) ∧ R I1⊂ R I2 ∧ top(R I2)=top(R I1)+D ∧
rccEC(RB, RO P EN) ∧ openBox(RB ∩ RO P EN, R I2,D)
PD.4 spout1(RB, R I1, R I2, RS P OU T , RO P EN, D) ≡
partialBox(RB, R I1, R I2, RO P EN, D) ∧
bubbleFreeAttachment(RS P OU T , RB) ∧ RO P EN ⊂ RS P OU T .
PD.5 spout(RS P OU T , RB, D) ≡
∃R I1,R I2,RO P EN spout1(RB, R I1, R I2, RS P OU T , RO P EN, D).
PD.6 regionBelow(R, Z , RB) ≡
∀R1:region R1⊂ RB ⇔ R1⊂ R ∧ top(RB)  Z .
PD.7 psBottom(P S, Z ) ≡
[∀P∈P S height(P S)  Z ] ∧
[∀Z1 Z1> Z ⇒ ∃P∈P S height(P ) < Z1].
PD.8 holds(T ,simpleSafeTilt(B IN, BT O P , V )) ≡
∃Z ,RB holds(T ,psBottom#(↑BT O P , Z ) ∧# regionBelow#(↑B IN, Z , RB)) ∧
V volumeOf(RB)
PD.9 simpleBox(R) ≡
∃R1 localMaxBox(R, R1) ∧
[∀R2 localMaxBox(R, R2) ⇒ R1= R2] ∧
[∀P ﬂowStoppingPoint(P , R) ⇒ P ∈ R1].
PD.10 holds(T ,isolated(R,U , L)) ⇔
∃D:distance D > 0 ∧
[∀O :object holds(T ,dist#(↑O , R) <# D) ⇒ O ∈ U ] ∧
[∀L1:liquidChunk holds(T ,↑L1⊂# expand#(R, D)) ⇒ subchunk(L1, L)].
PD.11 maxBox(RB, R I) ≡
openBox(RB, R I) ∧ [∀RC openBox(RB, RC) ∧ R I ⊂ RC ⇒ R I = RC ].
PD.12 columnWithin(RC, R I) ≡
∃RB,Z T O P RB ⊂ R I ∧ thicklyConnected(RB) ∧ upColumn(RB, Z T O P , RC)
PD.13 P ∈horizExpand(P S, D) ⇔
∃P A∈P S dist(P , P S)  D ∧ height(P A)=height(P ).
PD.14 onlyChannelsInReg(RB, RE, RX, Z T O P , D) ≡
∀P weakTopPoint(P , RB) ∧ height(P )  Z T O P ∧ P ∈ RE ⇒
[P ∈ RX∨ horizExpand(P , D) ⊂ RE ∨ [∃R I openBox(RB, R I) ∧ P ∈ R I]]
PS.7 asserts that oPitcher is a “simple box” throughout the scenario. This means that (a) throughout j0, oPitcher bounds
at most one locally maximal boxed region; and (b) that the only ﬂow stopping points associated with oPitcher are in the
inside of the pitcher. Thus, no ﬂow of liquid outside the pitcher can have its ﬂow blocked by a piece of the pitcher.
PS.8 together with PD.8, PD.7, PD.6 asserts that from t0 to t1, the pitcher stays suﬃciently upright that the volume of the
inside of the pitcher below the bottom of bTopPitcher is always greater than the volume of the liquid l0. This guarantees
that bInsidePitcher does not overﬂow between t0 and t1. (This is a suﬃcient condition, not a necessary one; the cupped
region may actually extend higher than the lowest point of bTopPitcher.)
PS.9 states that bSpout is a “spout” for oPitcher from time t1 onward. This is a geometric constraint whose purpose is to
guarantee that any overﬂow out of the pitcher to the outside must pass through bSpout. The geometric deﬁnition is a little
complicated. We say (PD.3) that RB is a partial box with true inside R I1, overﬂow region R I2, and opening RO P EN relative
to the overﬂow distance D if the following hold (Fig. 16):
• RB is a locally maximal box with inside R I1.
• The union of RB with RO P EN forms a open box with inside equal to R I2. R I2 contains R I1 and has a top D higher
than the top of R I1.
RS P OUT is a spout for RB if
• RB is a partial box with opening RO P EN which is a subset of RS P OUT .
• RS P OUT ∪ RB has no internal cavities other than the ones that are already in RB (RS P OUT is a bubble free attachment
to RB (PD.1)).
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Problem speciﬁcation: Axioms
Axioms:
PS.1 t0 < t1 < t2
PS.2 oPitcher = source(bInsidePitcher) = source(bTopPitcher) = source(bSpout).
PS.3 holds(t0, openBox#(↑oPitcher,↑bInsidePitcher) ∧#
↑bTopPitcher =# topSurface#(↑bInsidePitcher))
PS.4 holds(t0,l0 ⊂# bInsidePitcher)
PS.5 foreverAfter(t0,slowObjectMotion(oPitcher)).
PS.6 ∀T t0 T ⇒
∃H holds(T ,psBottom#(↑bTopPitcher,H) ∧#
H ># bottom#(↑bInsidePitcher))
PS.7 foreverAfter(t0,simpleBox(oPitcher))
PS.8 throughout(t0,t1, simpleSafeTilt(bInsidePitcher,bTopPitcher,liqVolume(l0))).
PS.9 foreverAfter(t1,spout#(↑bSpout,↑oPitcher, maxOutﬂow)).
PS.10 ∃R I holds(t2, maxBox#(↑oPitcher,R I)) ∧ volumeOf(R I) < liqVolume(l0).
PS.11 foreverAfter(t2,motionless(oPitcher)).
PS.12 source(bInsidePail) = oPail.
PS.13 ∃R holds(t0,regionBelow#(↑bInsidePail, top#(↑bInsidePail)−#maxOutﬂow,R)) ∧
volumeOf(R) > liqVolume(l0).
PS.14 holds(t0,maxBox#(↑oPail,↑bInsidePail) ∧# simpleBox(oPail))
PS.15 foreverAfter(t0,motionless(oPail)).
PS.16 foreverAfter(t1,top#(↑bInsidePail) <# bottom#(↑bSpout)).
PS.17 holds(t0, columnWithin#(pouringRegion,↑bInsidePail, topPouringRegion) ∧#
dist#(pouringRegion,↑oPail) ># maxOutﬂow)
PS.18 foreverAfter(t1,rccNTPP#(expand#(↑bSpout, 2·maxOutﬂow), pouringRegion))
PS.19 foreverAfter(t2,onlyChannelsInReg#(↑oPitcher, pouringRegion,↑bSpout,top#(↑bSpout),maxOutﬂow)
PS.20 foreverAfter(t0, isolated(expand#(convexHull#(↑oPitcher), 2·maxOutﬂow), { oPitcher }, l0))
PS.21 foreverAfter(t0, isolated(horizExpand#(pouringRegion ∪# ↑bInsidePail), maxOutﬂow)
{oPail, oPitcher }, l0)).
Infer:
∃L1,L2:liquidChunk eventuallyForever(↑l0 =# ↑L1∪# ↑L2∧#
liqInContainer(L1,oPitcher) ∧# liqInContainer(L2,oPail)).
Fig. 16. Partial box.
PS.10 asserts that at t2, the maximal volume of any region cupped by oPitcher is less than the volume of l0, so oPitcher
must have overﬂowed before t2.
PS.15 states that oPail is motionless throughout the scenario. Therefore any geometric property of the pail that holds at
t0 holds throughout the scenario.
PS.14 states that bInsidePail is the maximal open box formed by oPail. PS.13 states that the part of bInsidePail that is
at least maxOutﬂow below its top has a volume greater than l0. Thus, even if bInsidePail were ﬁlled with l0, the top of
bInsidePail is still in freeFlowingSpace.
PS.16 states that from t1 onward the bottom of the spout is higher than the top of the pail.
PS.17 deﬁnes the ﬁxed region “pouringRegion” as a vertical column rising from the inside of bInsidePail and at least
maxOuﬂow from the material of the pail (Fig. 17). The proof will work by showing that, once the liquid has been poured
from the spout, it remains inside pouringRegion
PS.18 asserts that, from time t1 onward, the spout bSpout is always inside pouringRegion, more than 2·maxOutﬂow from
the boundaries of pouringRegion.
PS.19 enforces the constraint that there are no channels on the outside of oPitcher that would allow liquid to ﬂow from
the inside of pouringRegion to within maxOutﬂow of the boundary of pouringRegion. Otherwise, one could construct a
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scenario in which the liquid pours out of the spout, but is then caught by a channel on the exterior of the pitcher and
guided to spill out at a point that is not over the pail.
PS.20 and PS.21 enforce the “isolation” conditions that no objects other than the pitcher and the pail and no liquids
other than l0 interacts with the pouring of the liquid. PS.20 states that no object other than oPitcher and no liquid other
than l0 comes within 2·maxOutﬂow of the convex hull of oPitcher. PS.21 states that no objects other than oPitcher and
oPail and no liquids other than l0 come within maxOutﬂow, horizontally, of the pouring region or of the inside of the pail.
In particular, the pail is empty at t0 and no liquid other than l0 pours into the pail.
5.1. Correctness proof
The proof of the desired inference from the axioms and the problem speciﬁcation is very much as sketched at the
beginning of Section 3. The detailed proof is rather long but not deep; it is given in the online appendix at http://www.cs.
nyu.edu/faculty/davise/papers/liqAppa.pdf.
The main steps are as follows (we enumerate only the most important axioms as justiﬁcations here): By CUP.1, PS.10
the liquid remains in the pitcher as the pitcher is lifted into position. By PS.12 at t2 the cupped volume in the pitcher is
less than the volume of l0; hence using SPILL.1 and SPILLD.5 the pitcher overﬂows at some point between t1 and t2. It
follows from DOWN.2, DOWN.6 using a proof by contradiction that the liquid cannot rise more than maxOutﬂow above the
region cupped by the pitcher. Hence, by PS.11, any liquid that ﬂows out of the pitcher or out of the overﬂow region must
go through the spout. By PS.12, PS.13, after t2 the cupped region in the pitcher is too small to hold the liquid; hence it
must ﬂow out of the pitcher. By PS.8 there is always some cupped region inside the pitcher; hence by CUP.1 some of the
liquid remains in the pitcher. By DOWN.2 the liquid in the overﬂow region must ﬂow downward through the spout. When
it ﬂows out of the spout, by PS.20 it is inside pouringRegion. Using DOWN.2, DOWN.3, DOWN.4, PS.9, PS.21, PS.15 once the
liquid is past the spout it remains inside pouringRegion until it is inside bInsidePail and at least maxOutﬂow below the top
of the pail. (This is by far the hardest part of the proof; the proof is given in Lemma 64 of the appendix). Once the liquid is
inside the pail, then by CUP.1, PS.10 it remains inside the pail. By DOWN.5 the part of pouringRegion above the pail and the
overﬂow region above the pitcher are eventually empty. Hence eventually some of the liquid is in the pail, some of it is in
the pitcher, and none of it is anywhere else.
5.2. Consistency proof
Of course, the above inference is only signiﬁcant if the problem speciﬁcations are consistent with the domain axioms;
if they are not, then one can prove anything at all. One can demonstrate that the speciﬁcations are consistent with the
axioms by constructing a speciﬁc model of the shapes and motions of the objects and the ﬂow of the liquid that satisﬁes
the speciﬁcations and axioms.
We sketch one such model below (Fig. 18). Assume a coordinate system where the z-axis is the vertical and where the
unit length is one inch.
Atemporal speciﬁcations:
Assume that maxOutﬂow = 2.
The inside of the pail is a 18 × 18 × 19 rectangular solid. The pail is a cubical box around the inside, open on top and
with one inch walls on the sides and the bottom.
The pitcher is a 10 × 10 × 9 rectangular box, with the 8 × 8 × 8 block cut out from the center top, and with a notch 2
inches deep cut out of the lower x-face. In other words: the bottom of the pitcher is 10 × 10 × 1. The lower x-side is 1 ×
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10 × 7 (this overlaps with the bottom). The upper x-side is 1 × 10 × 10, and the two y-faces are 10 × 1 × 10. The spout
is the 1 × 8 × 2 notch cut out from the top of the lower x-face.
The volume of the liquid is 256 cubic inches.
shape(bInsidePail)= [1,19] × [1,19] × [1,20]
shape(oPail)= ([0,20] × [0,20] × [0,20]) − bInsidePail.
shape(bInsidePitcher)= [31,39] × [6,14] × [1,8].
shape(oPitcher)= ([30,40] × [5,15] × [0,9]) − (bInsidePitcher∪ ([30,39] × [6,14] × [8,9]).
shape(bSpout)= [30,31] × [6,14] × [8,9]
liqVolume(l0) = 256.
pouringRegion= [4,15] × [5,15] × [4,43]
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Initial State: At time t0, the pitcher and pail are at the positions speciﬁed by their shape. The liquid occupies the bottom
half of the pitcher.
value(t0,placement(oPitcher))= value(s0,placement(oPail)) = identity.
value(t0,place(l0))= [31,39] × [6,14] × [1,5].
Motion of the rigid objects: The pail is motionless throughout. From t = 0 to t = 1/2, the pitcher translates vertically 30
inches. From t = 1/2 to t = 1, the pitcher translates horizontally to the left 20 inches. From t1 to t2 the pitcher rotates at a
constant rate around the line x = 15, z = 35; this line is parallel to the y-axis, sits at the top of the liquid, in the center of
the x-extent of the top surface of the liquid. After t2 the pitcher is motionless.
motionless(oPail,j0)
0 T  1/⇒value(T ,placement(oPitcher))= translate(0,0,60T)
1/2 T  1⇒value(T ,placement(oPitcher)) = translate(−40(T − 1/2),0,30)
1 T  2⇒value(T ,placement(oPitcher)) = rotateAroundAxis({〈15, Y ,35〉|real(Y )},π(T − 1)/4)
(In the above formulas, the function “translate(X, Y , Z )” maps coordinates to a translation and the function “rotateAround-
Axis(P SL, A)” maps a line P SL and an angle A to a rotation in the obvious way.)
foreverAfter(t2,motionless(oPitcher)).
Liquid ﬂow: There is no ﬂow in the y-dimension. Hence, we will describe the ﬂow purely in terms of its x–z component,
From t0 to t1 the liquid simply translates along with the pitcher.
The liquid ﬂow from t1 to t2 is described as follows: Let Q 2 be the region-valued ﬂuent whose value is always the
boxed region bounded by oPail ∪ bSpout. From t1 to t2, the liquid ﬁlls the section of that region which is below the plane
z = 35. That is, we are supposing that the liquid ﬂows in exactly the same way it would if the notch were ﬁlled in. Note that
the volume of this section is constant; viewed in a coordinate system attached to the pitcher, this ﬂow involves vacating a
triangular wedge on the right and ﬂowing into a congruent wedge on the left. Note that at t1, the liquid is simply observing
rule 4 and in the region cupped by the pitcher. At some time tm before t2, it reaches the edge of the pitcher and then starts
to overﬂow. Between tm and t2 the liquid is ﬁlling the maximal cupped region in the pitcher, and the volume of that region
is monotonically decreasing; hence by SPILLD.5 the liquid is overﬂowing out of the pitcher. Since it continues to overﬂow
until t2, and since the speciﬁed region of overﬂow is all within the driven area, this pattern of ﬂow is allowed by our rules.
Within the region occupied by the liquid, the ﬂow consists of a volume-preserving “rotation” around the axis of rotation.
That is, as the pitcher rotates, every wedge of liquid centered at the axis replaces the wedge of equal volume to its left.
At t2, then, the liquid ﬁlls the cupped region bounded by oPitcher, plus a trapezoid over that (Fig. 19.A). After t2 the
pitcher is motionless; hence, the volume of the maximal cupped region is constant; hence, by SPILLD.5 the liquid is no
longer considered to be overﬂowing, and is no longer driven. The liquid in the cupped region remains where it is; the liquid
in the overﬂow trapezoid must all ﬂow down. The liquid in the overﬂow trapezoid ﬂows downward and to the left into the
triangle to the left of the overﬂow trapezoid, following the ﬂow lines shown in Fig. 19.B. To see intuitively that this can be
done while maintaining constant volume, imagine cutting each ﬂow tube into segments of equal volume, in a way that is
consistent across the ﬂow tubes. Then in each small time interval T , each segment ﬂows into the place vacated by the
next segment in the tube.
Once the liquid has ﬂowed out the bottom of the left hand triangle, it ﬂows vertically in a column at a constant rate
down toward the pail. Until the column hits the pail, it maintains its columnar shape. Once it has hit the bottom, there will
be a rising pool occupying a cupped region at the bottom of the pail. The part of the falling liquid more than maxOutﬂow
above the top of this pool is in ﬂowUndisruptedSpace and therefore continues to fall down in a column. The part of the
liquid that is above the top of the pool but less than maxOutﬂow above it is in ﬂowDisruptedSpace; it ﬂows downward and
outward, fast enough to make room for the column falling down after it.
It is an easy, but long and very uninteresting, exercise to specify this ﬂow in closed formulas.
Verifying that the speciﬁed ﬂow actually satisﬁes the axioms is not trivial, since some of the axioms involve quantifying
over all regions, or all region-valued ﬂuents, but neither is it very diﬃcult.
Of course, it would be undesirable to have to construct an explicit model like this for each new problem speciﬁcation,
to make sure that the theory meaningfully applies to it. Much better would be to have a general meta-theorem stating that
all problem speciﬁcations of a speciﬁed form are consistent with the axioms.
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5.3. Other inferences
The above inference is the only one that I have worked through in full detail. However, I am quite conﬁdent that the
following inferences are also justiﬁed in the theory. Moreover, their proof can use many of the same general lemmas already
worked through for our example.
• It is possible to ladle liquid out of a bowl with a spoon, if the spoon is immersed in the liquid and then lifted out,
maintaining its cupped shape. The spoon may be immersed, either by plunging it in, so that the liquid spills over its
side, or by sliding it in.
• If pebbles are gradually dropped into a vase ﬁlled with liquid, the level of the liquid will gradually rise. Once the volume
of the pebbles plus the volume of the liquid exceeds the capacity of the vase, the vase will overﬂow.
• If an object with no cups is immersed in a bowl of liquid and then lifted out, the removal of the object does not bring
any liquid with it.
• If a large object is lowered gradually into a bowl of liquid, the liquid will reach the rim of the bowl just when the
volume of the part of the object below the rim plus the volume of the liquid is equal to the capacity of the bowl. If
part of the object is still above the liquid, then lowering the object any further will cause the bowl to overﬂow.
• (Archimedes). Consider a scenario in which (1) object A is placed inside a bowl; (2) the bowl is ﬁlled to the brim with
liquid; (3) object A is removed; (4) object B is placed inside the bowl. Assume that object A has no cups in which to
carry out liquid. The bowl will overﬂow during the execution of (4) if and only if the volume of B is greater than the
volume of A.
• If liquid is poured over a solid object suspended in the air, and the object does not form any cups then the liquid will
ﬂow down over the object, spreading a short distance beyond the bounds of the object. If the object does form cups
then all of the liquid that is not caught in those cups will pour down over the object in the same way.
• Suppose there is a body of liquid inside a simple cup with a plug at the bottom and the plug is removed. If there is
nothing below the cup, then all the liquid will ﬂow out the bottom. If the cup is itself inside a bowl then the liquid will
ﬂow out the bottom of the cup into the bowl until the level in the outer bowl is equal to the level in the cup.
• Suppose you have a W-shaped pail, and you pour from a pitcher into one of the internal cups (Fig. 20). The level of
liquid will rise until it is full. Once it is full, the liquid will start to pour off into the other internal cup. Once both
internal cups are full, the two pools of liquid will be joined on top, and the level will gradually rise across the entire
pail.
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Fig. 21. Anomalous ﬂow in channel.
6. The problem with channels
The most immediate problem with our theory is that it completely mispredicts the way that water ﬂows in a channel.
Not only does it fail to predict the correct behavior, it actually excludes the correct behavior. Suppose that there is a
channel whose cross-section has a radius greater than maxOutﬂow ﬁlled with ﬂowing water. The liquid chunks that are
more than maxOutﬂow from the boundaries of the channel, in the center-top of the channel, are in ﬂowUndisruptedSpace,
and therefore by Rule 5 ﬂow straight down rather than parallel to the channel. The only steady-state ﬂow pattern allowed
by rule 5 is one in which the water ﬂows down in the annulus which is maxOutﬂow from the boundary of the channel
(Fig. 21). This is all ﬂowDisruptedSpace, and therefore the liquid there is allowed to ﬂow parallel to the channel.
Thus, ﬁxing this problem has two parts. The ﬁrst part is to ﬁx Rule 5 so that it does not prohibit the true ﬂow down
the channel; the second part is to add rules that require the correct ﬂow. It is certainly possible that the ﬁrst part can be
accomplished through some fairly minor change to Rule 5 that will eliminate this problem, while still preserving the ability
to predict that liquid poured from the pitcher lands in the pail. I doubt it, however; I suspect that even the ﬁrst part of the
solution will involve explicitly characterizing channels and marking them, like overﬂow, as an exception to Rule 5.
In any case, for the second part of the solution we need rules that will allow us to predict the ﬂow of liquids in a
channel. I intend to address this in future work. In the meantime, the problem provides an interesting context for discussing
the issues involved in extending a theory like this. Absent any great simplifying insight, adding channel ﬂow to this theory
will probably involve the following:
• Deﬁning a channel geometrically. This is considerably more challenging than deﬁning a cup. A cup has a single distin-
guished direction—upward—which is ﬁxed. A channel has two – upward and forward—and the latter is deﬁned relative
to the channel and may change over the length of the channel. Also channels interact with each other and with other
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bumps, and ridges.
• Deﬁning the dynamics of “normal ﬂow” in a channel. Again this is more complicated than the dynamics of cupped
liquid; at its simplest, it is a steady-state ﬂow rather than a static condition. For example, an open channel overﬂows
its banks when the ﬂow rate into the channel exceeds the maximum ﬂow rate that the channel can sustain; expressing
this requires a substantially richer theory than the simple rule for an overﬂowing cup. As with cups, we would wish
to at least partially categorize ﬂow through a channel even in the case where the solid object or objects forming the
channel are in motion.
• Deﬁne the liquid in a channel as an exception to Rule 5.
• Make sure that the rules accommodate the case of non-steady-state ﬂow in a channel; for example, a chunk of liquid
falls onto the side of a channel. The prediction in a case like this need not be precise, but it should not be absurd, and
it should smoothly interface with the normal ﬂow through a channel. For instance, if a chunk of liquid falls onto the
side of a channel which has a channeled ﬂow in it, the chunk should somehow merge with the channeled ﬂow.
• Make sure that the examples that have been worked out still work. For instance the spout of a pitcher may well be a
channel, or it may not; make sure that the pitcher example works in either case.
• As far as possible, check that the theory is still consistent.
Another problem is leaky cups. A cup with a small hole in fact works like a cup except for a slow leak, and can be used to
carry liquid. But in our theory, a cup with a small hole is not a cup at all; the liquid inside can ﬂow down (Deﬁnition 3.4.4)
and therefore must ﬂow down (Rule 6). In particular, if the cup is lifted, our theory states that the liquid must ﬂow out
the hole fast enough that the absolute height of the top of the liquid always decreases. This problem, however, unlike the
problem of channels is easy to ﬁx; it is merely necessary to add a new rule similar to rule 4 stating that leaky cups leak
slowly, and to add the liquid cupped in a leaky cup as a part of nonFlowingSpace in Deﬁnition 3.4.2.
7. Conclusions and future work
We have constructed and formalized a theory that supports qualitative reasoning about many scenarios involving liquid
ﬂowing around slowly moving objects. There are a few scenarios that it handles badly, but it seems likely that these can be
corrected and that this theory can be an important part of a larger theory of commonsense physical reasoning.
The most important next steps in this research are:
• To develop a theory of liquid ﬂow in channels.
• To develop a theory of liquid ﬂow around rapidly moving objects.
• To integrate a theory of pressure, including atmospheric pressure.
• To integrate a theory of agents, with feedback from perception to manipulation, so that one can describe the plan of
carefully pouring liquid from a pitcher to a pail and reason about its feasibility.
• To deﬁne a reasonable subclass of inferences, particularly prediction, that can be effectively implemented. The com-
plexities of the proof in the appendix should not be discouraging, here; this is a complete proof based on very general
axioms. If the language of the problem speciﬁcation and the closed-world assumptions can be standardized, and pow-
erful general lemmas can be subsumed into procedures, then it may well be possible to develop an inference engine
whose complexity is not much greater than the English description of the reasoning involved on page 1546.
In the longer term, the critical problems are to identify signiﬁcant classes of inference in this domain, to develop ef-
fective algorithms for these, and to integrate these into knowledge-based systems for applications such as design, text
interpretation, and automated tutoring.
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